What ever happened to certification?

Defense AR Journal, April, 2009 by William R. Fast

The primary purpose of this research was to investigate how well the training, education, and experience requirements of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) have been implemented by the Department of Defense (DoD). If the DoD is to win the war for talent, it must be concerned about the professionalism and competence of its acquisition workforce. First, a historical analogy was considered. Next, the course of workforce certification was traced from its inception in the DAWIA through today. Recent best practices in acquisition workforce development were also studied. Finally, current thinking in academia and the private sector was sampled to shed light on how to better motivate the acquisition workforce toward certification.

A HISTORICAL ANALOGY--TALENT WARS DURING THE CIVIL WAR

In 1861, on the eve of the American Civil War, the active officer corps of the Regular army numbered 1,080. When Confederate President Jefferson Davis (West Point class of 1828 and a veteran of the Mexican War) called for a 100,000-man volunteer force, 286 of these officers entered the Confederate army. Of the 824 West Point graduates on the active rolls at the time, 184 went with the Confederacy, including the likes of Generals Robert E. Lee and Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. In addition, the pre-war South had an established military tradition and several military institutions that produced two dozen general officers and even more talented regimental and staff officers (Matloff, 1996, p. 188).

On the federal side, President Abraham Lincoln (whose military experience consisted of three months with the Illinois militia during the Black Hawk War) was initially left with two types of officers (Millet and Maslowski, 1984, p. 173). The first type preferred to exaggerate their difficulties and not fight battles. Even though he was a West Point graduate, General George B. McClellan epitomized this type of general officer as he failed to commit his reserve during the battle of Antietam (1862). Lincoln also selected some of his generals from among leading politicians in order to generate broader support for the war. The Union Army also had to live within an existing military department structure that promoted officers based upon their years of service (seniority) over their abilities. On the Confederate side, Davis promoted based upon ability and rarely let politics dictate the selection of military commanders. Thus, in the first two years of the war, the Confederate officers generally out-performed their federal counterparts.

The other type of officer found in the Union army could be characterized by General Ulysses S. Grant. After rising to General in Chief of the Union army in March 1864, Grant was relentless in his attacks on Lee's army of Northern Virginia. And, by April 1865, as Grant pursued Lee to Appomatox, a new generation of Union officer--officers who would take the fight to the enemy--had advanced through the ranks and replaced the politician-generals. By then, however, the South was exhausted and the Civil War was rapidly coming to an end.

From the many lessons that can be gleaned from this historical analogy, three are particularly applicable to today's war for talent. First, the sudden nature of the coming Civil War gave little time for recruitment, training, development, and testing of officers on either side of the Mason-Dixon line. Unprepared as either side was for the conflict, the initial advantage went to the South based not solely on the number of West Point-trained and experienced officers, but on other pools of talent--the Southern military institutions. Today, defense acquisition stands on the brink of entering the war for talent. Experienced acquisition workforce employees from the baby boomer (born 1946-1964) and veteran (born before 1946) generations are poised to retire in great numbers and today represent 76 percent of the civilian acquisition workforce. The generations in training and development, those behind the boomers and veterans, represent only 24 percent of the civilian workforce and cannot replace them on a one-for-one basis (USD[AT&L] Human Capital Strategic Plan, 2007). Defense acquisition leaders must seek other pools of talent as quickly as possible.

Second, the selection procedures and military experience of President Davis quickly elevated his most capable officers to key leadership positions. As a result, the Confederate army had a decided advantage over the Union army in the first two years of the war. And so it is today. Methods of developing and promoting the acquisition workforce should recognize capability. Recruiters need to clearly articulate defense acquisition workforce education, training, and experience requirements so as not to mislead potential workers. And, development policies and procedures must be reviewed to ensure that they do not inadvertently cause the most capable and experienced acquisition workers to depart for greener pastures.

Third, out of necessity, the army of the Potomac rid itself of the incompetent and political general officers, replacing them with younger men who were trained to take the fight to the enemy. At war's end (April 1865), these general officers were only in their mid-twenties, meaning that their training and experience had come on the fields of battle (Woodhead, 1991, p. 19). Not to insinuate that the baby boomer and veteran generation workers are incompetent or political, but it may only be four to five years before those that will replace them have to perform on the defense acquisition field of battle. Now is the time to get the next generation certified. Now is the time to let them participate as team players in key acquisition and contract actions. Now is the time to mentor and coach them in the finer points of defense acquisition and let them try their hand at managing the most challenging programs.