Joint capabilities and System-of-Systems solutions

Defense AR Journal, April-July, 2005 by Mary Maureen Brown, Rob Flowe

Recognizing the need to succeed in a new multilateral, asymmetric threat environment, the Department of Defense has promoted a radical transformation in operations to promote agility and enhance responsiveness. The transformation process, as well as the resulting new order of operations, relies heavily on System-of-Systems (SOS) solutions to effectively bridge existing gaps in operations. To date, a pervasive and possibly detrimental assumption has dominated the program management arena: single-system level management tools and methods apply equally well to the acquisition of SOS solutions. This research questions the general assumption that single-system methods are effective in an SOS arena. Based on an empirical analysis by subject matter experts, this research begins to flesh out an analytical framework for understanding the resource requirements that will underpin SOS solutions for joint capabilities.

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The need for joint capabilities has rekindled interest in integration and interoperability-based solutions. As such, System-of-Systems (1) (SOS) solutions represent a new and important commodity class in the acquisition domain (Krygiel, 1999). In terms of the investment resources allocated to them and the operational value of the capabilities they provide, the resource requirements have tremendous implications for Department of Defense (DoD) performance. Consequently, exploration into the drivers of cost and risk is the subject of inquiry. To date, a pervasive, and possibly detrimental, assumption has dominated the program management arena: single-system-level management tools and methods apply equally well to the acquisition of SOS solutions. This research questions the general assumption that single-system methods are effective in an SOS arena. Taking the position that the field as a whole lacks adequate understanding of the unique cost drivers that influence SOS initiatives, the following research uncovers many of the drivers that influence the cost, schedule, and performance of SOS efforts.

This paper begins with an overview of the genesis of joint capabilities and then characterizes the likely implications joint capabilities will have on the acquisition of SOS solutions. Begging the question "What are the critical hurdles to achieving SOS cost, schedule, and performance requirements?" we relate the survey findings of subject matter experts (SMEs) on their perceptions of the cost drivers that influence SOS initiatives. Finally, we close with a discussion on the implications of the SMEs' perceptions on acquisition cost and risk mitigation.

THE GENESIS OF JOINT CAPABILITIES

Under the auspices of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, DoD transformation became a compelling objective in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (Rumsfeld, 2003). During the cold war era, military strategy was predicated on the belief that deterrence was best achieved through arms superiority. As emphasized by Wilson (1985), organization matters. The arms race was achieved by heavy reliance on scientific management principles as an organizing paradigm (Hughes, 1998). Economies of scale were achieved in arms production through a capital-intensive industrial base that stressed the principles of scientific management: hierarchy, division of work, functional specialization, and the separation of planning from operations. These strategies gave rise to a plethora of individual subcultures with distinct missions, goals, and vocabularies.

From a resource perspective, programs were defined by each Service and collectively submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for review and approval, and then incorporated into the President's budget (DoD Directive [DoDD] 7045.14). Fiscal guidance issued by the OSD at the beginning of the cycle gave each of the Services a target that reflected an equitable distribution of resources. Generally, equities were preserved and programs would get their start without a great deal of joint scrutiny.

After achieving budgetary approval, the Services would mobilize teams of SMEs who were responsible for conducting trade-off analyses and ultimately defining a given system's requirements. Eventually, the requirements were captured in an Operational Requirements Document (ORD). Adhering to the divide-and-conquer perspective of scientific management, the process was fairly linear with distinct hand-offs occurring between the actors of the various stages of system development. In the relatively stable environment of the cold war, this sequential requirements-acquisition process was not without problems, but generally satisfactory. Adversaries engaged in the arms race philosophy and adopted similar processes, thus leveling the playing field.

Unless a program was designated as joint, joint requirements were rarely explicitly considered (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2003a; 2003b). For the most part, joint programs became de facto single-service efforts (GAO, 1998). This was achieved through an assignment process that designated a Lead Service, which tended to view joint requirements through its Service lens. The scientific management strategies promoted rapid production by minimizing the turbulence that often arises from interdependent activities.