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An assessment of the lead systems integrator concept as applied to the future combat system program

Defense AR Journal, Dec, 2005 by Scott Flood, Paul Richard

On October 12, 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, delivered the keynote address at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual symposium in Washington, D.C. In this momentous speech, he shared his vision for transforming the Army, with the goal of making the Army's forces "light enough to deploy, lethal enough to fight and win, survivable enough to return safely home ... and lean and efficient enough to sustain themselves whatever the mission." The vision called for an immediate off-the-shelf solution--which became the Stryker Brigade Combat Team--to "stimulate the development of doctrine, organizational design, and leader training" as the Army began to develop new technologies to field the objective force (Shinseki, 1999). A short time later, the Chief of Staff gave the Army its mission: build and field the first Unit of Action, equipped with Future Combat Systems (FCS), capable of full spectrum operations, by the end of 2010. The Army's response to this challenge was to initiate a revolutionary acquisition program that utilizes an innovative system development paradigm called a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI).

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This article provides an assessment of the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) concept, now that it has been in use for nearly 3 years on the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. It will not assess the progress of the FCS program, any of its pros and cons, nor the outlook for its future. This article will also avoid any quantitative or qualitative measures of how the chosen contractor team has been performing as the LSI. Rather, it will examine the idea of using an LSI on the FCS program, attempt to find the pros and cons of the concept, and offer recommendations should the Department of Defense (DOD) decide to implement this methodology on future weapon system acquisitions.

METHODOLOGY

Data for this assessment was gathered via document research and interviews. The authors conducted interviews with representatives from across the FCS program, including senior Army officials on the Department of the Army staff, Army representatives from the FCS program office, and other Army personnel from supporting organizations. We also interviewed officials from the LSI, and from their lower-tiered equipment suppliers. Because of the National Defense University's strict non-attribution policy, any comments referred to in this article, directly or indirectly, will not be attributed to individuals who were interviewed during the research for this article.

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

In order to meet the aggressive timeline laid out by the Chief of Staff, the Army formed a partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). The DARPA had the capability of using contracting instruments that were more flexible and responsive than those available to the Army. The Army/DARPA team enlisted the help of industry in a structured, multiphase program. In Phase I, four industry consortia teams were formed. These teams were each comprised of organizations and businesses from across a wide spectrum. There were representatives from traditional Army contractors combined with some whom had little or no experience with Army weapons systems. Some teams also had members from consulting firms and academia. The teams were provided funding by DARPA to come up with a conceptual design to meet the Chief of Staff's vision. For the FCS program, this was the Army's first utilization of contractors to do what had traditionally been done organically. Industry's rapid and thoughtful response set the stage for the future.

The results of these four independent studies were then used to develop the operational requirements for the FCS. The initial system configuration of the FCS contained nine manned ground vehicles, four classes of unmanned aerial vehicles, four different unmanned robotic ground vehicles, and numerous unmanned ground sensors, communications networks, and intelligence systems. The updated configuration, as of August 26, 2004, is shown in Figure 1.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Any of these systems would likely warrant an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I or II program by itself. Designing and developing all 20 of them, plus the network systems, in half the time normally allotted for a single system, created a daunting challenge for the Army acquisition workforce.

WHY AN LSI?

During the requirements refinement period, program officials quickly recognized the monumental level of effort that would be required to integrate the functionality and operational aspects of all of the systems that would be needed to meet the requirements. These same officials also believed that the Army's acquisition workforce lacked enough people with the expertise to execute the systems engineering function in the timeframe and at the level required for the FCS program. Thus, the Army again turned to industry to provide the necessary "brainpower," in the form of an LSI. In the words of one senior Army official, "The basic nature of the [FCS] requirement lends itself to using an LSI" (Source #1, personal communication, February 23, 2005). His perspective was that the FCS acquisition takes major weapon system procurements to the next level of complexity, and using an LSI is merely taking the customary role of a prime contractor to the next level.

An assessment of the lead systems integrator concept as applied to the future combat system program

Defense AR Journal, Dec, 2005 by Scott Flood, Paul Richard

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