Holes In The System

Air Safety Week, March 14, 2005

Aviation security has holes that need plugging, according to the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA), a trade association representing about 22,000 pilots, notably from American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, AirTran and UPS. In issuing their latest report card, Capt. Jon Safley said, "The grades are the same as in the summer of 2003, when we had hoped that these would be an improvement, particularly in the wake of the intelligence reform act." (See ASW, Oct. 13, 2003)

The Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Act, passed in the wake of the independent 9/11 Commission recommendations, contains several hundred million dollars for various aviation security projects, but the act does not contain deployment deadlines, according to Capt. Jay Norelius, who heads CAPA's security oversight committee.

Among the biggest beefs from the pilots is that airport employees are not screened prior to gaining access to the airside of airport operations. They are required to undergo a background check, and to have identification, but neither they nor their bags are screened. Pilots, on the other hand, also have identification and are screened.

CAPA officials also believe that air cargo needs to be screened, e.g., inspected. This is considerably beyond the present reliance on the "known shipper" program. "We don't care who the shipper is, we want to know what's in the box," Safley said.

CAPA distilled its concerns into a report card. Details of CAPA's concerns are as follows:

* Perimeter security: CAPA laments the failure to fund and standardize perimeter security measures. It wants government oversight and support for this function.

* Screening: Despite the fact that passengers and luggage are screened more thoroughly post-9/11, CAPA believes every employee with airside access should be screened, and cargo should be inspected, both for all-cargo and for passenger flights.

* Credentialing: Identification badges need biometric identifiers, like fingerprints. A photograph isn't good enough.

* Federal air marshals: There aren't enough of them. CAPA recommends increasing the number of air marshals.

* Crew training: CAPA maintains there are no mandatory security training standards at this time. Although improved since 9/11, this training continues to fall victim to a lack of standardization from airline to airline, and selfdefense training is not mandatory for crew members. "It's morphed into voluntary training," says Safley.

* Threat intelligence: Not all airlines share intelligence about the terrorist threat with aircrews. American Airlines and some others do, but not all airlines, according to Safley. "It's only effective if it gets to the primary consumer - the captain," he said. For example, American had information about the danger posed by shoe bombs, but had not passed the information to the crew when shoe bomber Richard Reed boarded, he said. Since that experience, American is one of the carriers sharing this kind of information, and that practice needs to be emulated at all carriers.

* Missile defenses: The experience of the DHL jet struck be a missile at Baghdad highlighted this threat for all U.S. airliners, both domestically and overseas, Safely said (see ASW, Dec. 8, 2003). As a minimum, he urged deployment of missile defenses for U.S. airliners operating to overseas locations, to include airliners operating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). It should be noted that missile defenses for airliners were deemed too expensive and unreliable for airliners in a January study by the RAND Corp.

* Reinforced flight deck doors: They're required on passenger aircraft, but not cargo jets, which CAPA regards as a shortcoming.

* Federal flight deck officers: Fewer than 5,000 pilots out of a total workforce of more that 100,000 pilots have completed TSA training and are armed to protect the cockpit. According to CAPA, the TSA has not supported the program.

Overall, said Safely, the security situation has improved, but there are many areas where continued improvement is necessary.

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