Bombing Attacks Peaked in 1980s, But Dramatic Decline in 1990s is No Cause for Complacency

Air Safety Week, April 10, 2000

Terrorist bombing attacks on airliners have exacted a considerably higher toll in dead and injured over the decades than hijackings. Indeed, roughly 2.5 times more people have been casualties of bombing attacks, despite the fact that hijackings occur 12 times more often.

In other words, a bombing attack on an airliner may be described as a "low frequency but high consequence" event. Indeed, the consequences of a successful terrorist bombing attack seem to relate directly to the generally larger size and increased seating density of airliners flying today. This phenomenon might be called the downside of increased capacity. If the target airplanes are bigger, the implications for aviation security are significant. There is less room for error. One bomb contained in the billions of bags, packages, cargo and mail items loaded annually aboard airliners can have devastating consequences.

Security officials with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) make a distinction between hijackings and bombings, noting that hijackings generally are not meant to cause deaths, as most such events have been committed recently by people seeking asylum in another country, or by those seeking to make a political statement. These events, FAA officials believe, "generally do not result in deaths or injuries unless something goes wrong." The distinction between the intentions of the perpetrators (to flee or to destroy) may be immaterial to the intentions of flight crews and passengers to arrive intact. In fact, FAA officials note, in the 1990s ten times as many casualties resulted from hijackings than from bombings. They were not intended, but occurred "because something went wrong during the incident."

Security breaches

Nevertheless, the threat of bombing attacks on airliners is of particular significance in light of serious deficiencies in U.S. aviation security. Recent revelations have included convicted felons being hired as security screeners, and the discovery of a loaded pistol in the lavatory of a U.S. airliner on a domestic flight. Porous aviation security was sharply criticized at a U.S. Senate

hearing last week. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R, Texas), chairwoman of the Aviation Subcommittee, complained that the FAA "has been slow to implement...vital security improvements." As an example, she said the FAA's leisurely five-year plan to finalize regulations to improve training requirements for screeners "is too long to wait."

"Technology upgrades have also been slow in coming," she groused. As a consequence, she plans to introduce legislation that would do three things:

1. Require criminal background checks for all baggage handlers. Under present "trigger" criteria, a background check is only conducted if the job applicant indicates an employment gap of 12 months or longer. Hutchison noted that "43 percent of violent felons serve an average of only 7 months" in prison. As such, under current procedures, a seven-month employment gap would not, of itself, trigger a background check.

2. Her "Airport Security Improvement Act" also would mandate a five-fold increase in required training, from eight hours of classroom and 40 hours of onthe-job training to 40 hours of classroom and 40 hours of on-the-job instruction.

3. Finally, Hutchison's legislation would hold screeners who fail to detect weapons and explosives, even in FAA security tests, liable to suspension and dismissal. It is not clear how this legislation would square with the FAA's recent initiative to license security companies (see ASW, Jan. 24, 2000).

Looming over the concern about U.S. security is the dark shadow of the 1988 bombing of Pan American Flight 103, a B747, over Lockerbie, Scotland. It remains the record-setter as the single largest loss of American lives from a terrorist attack, far outweighing the loss of life in the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.

Two accused Libyans go on trial this spring; they are charged with placing the bomb in a bag checked onto an Air Malta flight that was subsequently loaded aboard the Pan Am jet at Frankfurt without being matched to a passenger. This oversight was in direct violation of a standing FAA order at the time, for which Pan Am subsequently was convicted and fined heavily for negligence.

There is no question that bombs with 2 pounds or less of explosives concealed on airliners and designed to detonate at altitude can kill hundreds. The Pan Am bombing remains a searing experience in the American consciousness. Another such attack would be hugely embarrassing to the platoons of government officials who have assured the public that minimum-wage screeners manning the front lines of America's aviation security system are up to the task of outwitting terrorists' attempts to disguise a bomb well enough to slip through the system.

Decade of discontent

To be sure, the 1980s marked a particularly grim decade for bombing attacks. The toll of nearly 1,300 dead was twice the 650 killed in bombing attacks in the 1970s. The 1990s have been blessed with relatively few successful bombing attacks, but there is little reason for complacency. Aircraft are getting bigger; a single successful bombing attack on the coming "super jumbo" with 500+ passengers could kill roughly twice as many as those who lost their lives in the 1985 bombing of an Air India 747, in which 328 were killed (as compared to 259 on the Pan Am 103 jet). FAA officials believe that larger aircraft may be better able to withstand a bombing attack. For example, a 1982 bombing attack on another Pan Am 747 blew a hole in the plane's side, killing one and injuring 15, but the airplane landed safety. On the other hand, had the 1995 plot by terrorist Ramzi Yousef to bomb up to 12 U.S. aircraft succeeded, FAA officials believe that more deaths from bombings would have occurred in the 1990s than in any previous decade. This observation underscores the "low frequency but high consequence" nature of the bomb threat.