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NTSB Safety Forum on UAVs

Air Safety Week, April 28, 2008

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is holding a three-day forum on the safety of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) April 29-30 in the NTSB Board Room and Conference Center in Washington, DC.

The forum will provide an opportunity for the Safety Board and interested parties to understand the safety implications presented by the growing use of UAS in the National Airspace System.

Issues addressed will include: regulatory standards; integration with the NAS; perspectives of current UAS operators; design, certification and airworthiness; human factors; and, future UAS applications and perspectives of current users of the NAS.

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The forum is a result of the Safety Board's investigation into a Predator B unmanned aircraft that crashed near Nogales, AZ, in April 2006. The Board's October 2007 meeting on this accident resulted in 22 safety recommendations to address deficiencies associated with the civilian use of unmanned aircraft.

"The Nogales accident surfaced a number of important questions that need to be addressed if UAS's are to operate safely in the National Air Space," said Board Member Kitty Higgins, who will chair the forum. "We are very interested in the military's experience with UAS's, training of pilots, maintenance of the aircraft, communication with Air Traffic Control and oversight of UAS operations by public use agencies and other operators."

The forum will include representatives from the military, industry, the FAA, and government agencies involved in UAS operations.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on Oct. 16, 2007 entered a new era of oversight, making a "historic" ruling on the probable cause of an unmanned aircraft accident.

While the reasons for the crash were not unexpected, the Safety Board's numerous recommendations growing out their accident investigation could have far-reaching effects on how unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are built and operated and how pilot training and qualifications are set.

The safety recommendations approved by the Safety Board stemmed from the April 25, 2006 accident in which a $6.5 million General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) turboprop- powered Predator B looking for illegal immigrants for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CPB) crashed within 100 yards of a house in a sparsely populated residential area near Nogales, Arizona. Luckily, no one on the ground was injured, but The remotely piloted 66-foot wingspan drone was substantially damaged.

The Predator B flight originated from the Libby Army Airfield (HFU), Sierra Vista, AZ.

The flight was being flown from a ground control station (GCS) located at HFU. The GCS contains two nearly identical consoles, pilot payload operator (PPO)-1, and PPO-2.

During a routine mission, a certified pilot controls the UAV from the PPO-1 console and the camera payload operator (typically a U.S. Border Patrol Agent) controls the camera from PPO-2. The aircraft controls (flaps, stop/feather, throttle, and speed lever) on PPO-1 and PPO-2 are identical. However, when control of the UAV is being accomplished from PPO-1, the controls at PPO-2 are used to control the camera.

The pilot employed by GA-ASI as part the Predator B turn-key operation reported that during the flight the console at PPO-1 "locked up", prompting him to switch control of the UAV to PPO-2. Checklist procedures state that prior to switching operational control between the two consoles, the pilot must match the control positions on the new console to those on the console, which had been controlling the UAV.

The pilot stated in an interview that he "got in a hurry and did not use the checklist." The result was that the stop/feather control in PPO-2 was in the fuel cutoff position when the switch over from PPO-1 to PPO-2 occurred. As a result, the fuel was cut off to the UAV when control was transferred to PPO-2.

The pilot stated that after the switch to the other console, he noticed the UAV was not maintaining altitude but did not know why. As a result he decided to shut down the GCS so that the UAV would enter its 'lost link' procedure, which called for the UAV to climb to 15,000 feet above mean sea level and to fly a predetermined course until contact could be established.

But with no engine power, the UAV continued to descend below line-of-site communications and further attempts to re-establish contact with the UAV were not successful.

NTSB investigators said lockups involving either PPO-1 or PPO-2 had occurred 16 times over the four months preceding the accident. Although the presence of redundant control consoles could mitigate the safety risks associated with a console lockup event, repeated reliance on this backup system increases pilot workload and the corresponding risk that an undesirable outcome will result.

Although a backup console is available to the pilot in the event of a lockup of PPO-1, it likely that this backup console will be in the fuel cutoff position when it's needed to backup PPO-1. Should the UA pilot fail to complete the condition lever reconfiguration step on the console transfer checklist to address the PPO-1 failure, inadvertent engine shutdown is all but assured.

Government Industry

NTSB Safety Forum on UAVs

Air Safety Week, April 28, 2008

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