Current Regulatory Activity

Air Safety Week, Jan 5, 2004

Editor's Note: See especially the Dec. 12, 2003, entry, which introduces the concept of a Complex Supplemental Type Certification (STC), and the Dec. 30 entry, which documents yet another delay in an expanded service difficulty reporting system propounded in September 2000

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 31, 2003 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) Docket No. 2002-NM-338-AD Fuel tank safety.

Summary of Situation: Bombardier [Toronto: BBDb] DHC-8-102, -103, -106, - 201, -202, -301 and -315 airplanes. Inspect underside of wing fuel tank access covers on these twin-turboprop aircraft for signs of chafing damage to lockwire tail. Contact between lockwire pigtail and stiffener could provide an ignition source within the fuel tank and consequent explosion should the cover be struck by lightning.

Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 30. Fittings improperly installed facing outboard side of wing rather than the inboard side. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) action follows that of its counterpart regulatory agency, Transport Canada. Action also raises to mandatory level manufacturer's Alert Service Bulletin A8-28-33 but eliminates reports of findings, saying, "The FAA does not need this information from operators."

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 31, 2003 Notice, extension of comment period. Docket No. TSA-2003-16345 Aviation security, cost of.

Summary of Situation: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is extending the deadline for industry comments on the Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee (ASIF). The Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001 authorized the government to impose ASIF, basically requiring carriers to help pay the added cost of post-9/11 security. A rate of 8.3% of carrier screening costs was established.

Action Date & Comments: Comments now due Feb. 5. Original deadline was Jan. 5. The fee was suspended June 1, 2003, and was re-imposed starting Sept. 30, 2003. The temporary suspension was in accord with the "Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003."

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 30, 2003 Final rule, delay of effective date Docket No. FAA-2000-7952 Maintenance-related safety.

Summary of Situation: Delay of effective date of service difficulty reporting (SDR) expanded requirements. This announcement marks the sixth effective date for implementation of an expanded SDR system, and at a time when carriers are outsourcing more maintenance: * Jan. 16, 2001: Original effective date.* April 30, 2001: Second effective date (3-month slip).* Jan. 16, 2002: Third effective date (9-month delay).* Jan. 16, 2003: Fourth effective date (12-month slide).* Jan. 16, 2004: Fifth effective date (another 12-month slide).* Jan. 31, 2006: Sixth effective date (more than a 24-month extension).

Action Date & Comments: Effective date now slated for Jan. 31, 2006. In what has the earmarks of an annual exercise, the FAA has again delayed implementing more rigorous SDR requirements, to include reports of malfunctions on the ground as well as in the air (see ASW, Jan. 20, 2003). Last year, the FAA said its Jan. 16, 2004, implementation date was "firm." This year, the FAA says previous delays were announced to give the agency more time to consider industry concerns, saying this latest delay in the effective date "is necessary to allow additional time for us to address industry concerns." Those concerns include the potential for "duplicate reporting of certain failures, malfunctions and defects." This latest action is the longest delay yet, from an initial 3-month slip to 24 months, bringing the total implementation delay to more than five years from publication of the final rule.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 24, 2003 NPRM Docket No. 2001-NM-148-AD Cockpit/cabin air health and safety.

Summary of Situation: British Aerospace BAe 146 series airplanes. The airplane is a four-engine regional jet. Requires repetitive visual inspections of air conditioning packs to detect oil leaks that could foul the cockpit/cabin air, resulting in potential for passenger discomfort and crew impairment endangering continued safe flight and landing. Malfunctions of the bleed air system can cause the cabin and cockpit to be contaminated with a cocktail of volatile organic compounds. These chemicals can have a "neurotoxin" effect on the body (e.g., like military nerve gas), ranging in severity based on the concentration of agents. Cases have occurred where the effects were so severe that occupants had to be evacuated to the hospital after landing (see ASW, Oct. 18, 1999).

Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 23. FAA action follows that of UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and manufacturer's service bulletin ISB.21-150 (Rev. 2) of Oct. 24, 2002. However, FAA says reports of pack inspections, called for in the service bulletin (SB), are not required as part of its proposed airworthiness directive (AD) action. The FAA cites four cases where contaminated air impaired aircrews. The Swedish accident investigation board, the Statens haverikommission (SHK), has documented 22 cases where BAe 146 flight crews were affected; in one case the captain's motor responses and vision were so impaired that he handed over the controls to the copilot in order to don his emergency oxygen, the copilot having donned his mask a few moments before (see ASW, Dec. 17, 2001). BAe 146 air quality was the subject of a 1999 parliamentary inquiry in Australia.