Oklahoma Basketball Team Crash Spurs Overhaul of Oversight

Air Safety Week, June 23, 2003

The moral of the story is that it is essential to be able to quickly recognize a failed/frozen/erroneous attitude instrument. As things now stand in many airplanes, one can have a failed/frozen instrument with or without OFF flag - become uneasy and perhaps look hopefully across the cockpit and see the standby and first officer's instruments also dynamically in a state of flux (as the airplane enters its unusual attitude). The pilot should be able to rely upon a good F/O's cross-check, but experience has shown that the classic cases after take-off always have the F/O involved in changing frequencies and communicating (or data-inputting to the flight management system, FMS). In the Air India case the first officer was aware of the captain's failed instrument but the captain would not relinquish control and died chasing his failed instrument.

Source: http://www.iasa.com.au/osu.htm

The Difference an Accident Makes Oklahoma State University Athletic Team
Travel Policies

Item: Put into effect April 22, 2002
Before the Accident In effect Jan. 27, 2001 (the night of accident):
After the Accident:

Item: Number of pilots
Before the Accident In effect Jan. 27, 2001 (the night of accident): Copilot
optional, depending on weather and/or length of trip. Accident pilot often
flew as a single pilot because OSU athletic staff wanted to use all the
seats.
After the Accident: Two pilots required.

Item: Pilot qualifications
Before the Accident In effect Jan. 27, 2001 (the night of accident):
OSU pilots required or qualified hired part-time pilots, instrument rated,
commercial pilot's license, min. of 2,500 hours as pilot-in-command,
500 in multi-engine airplane.
After the Accident: Must be full time pilot, w/ 1st class medical
certificate, type rated in airplane to be used, min. of 200 hours in type,
with 20 hours flying in past 90 days, and thee instrument approaches and
three night landings in past 90 days. Copilot must have multi-engine and
instrument ratings, including 100 hours in type, 10 hours in past 90 days,
and three instrument approaches and three night landings in past 90 days.

Item: Flight conditions
Before the Accident In effect Jan. 27, 2001 (the night of accident): Day or
night in visual or IFR (instrument flight rules) conditions. Pilot judgment
regarding whether conditions were safe for takeoff.
After the Accident: All flights operated on IFR flight plan; aircraft may
not depart into forecast hazardous weather conditions, including severe
icing, thunderstorms, severe turbulence or windshear. Passengers cannot
enter cockpit or distract pilots when aircraft is below 10,000 feet.

Item: Use of donated aircraft
Before the Accident In effect Jan. 27, 2001 (the night of accident):
Permitted (accident aircraft was donated for the fatal trip).
After the Accident: Donated aircraft permitted for coaches and staff but not
flights carrying student athletes. Donated aircraft must now be powered by
two or more turbine engines and certified for flight into known icing
conditions.

Item: Outside advice
Before the Accident In effect Jan. 27, 2001 (the night of accident): None.
After the Accident: Aviation consultant retained to evaluate certification
and safety records of charter air carriers, time-share and other aircraft,
with final authority for approval.

Item: Aircraft maint-enance
Before the Accident In effect Jan. 27, 2001 (the night of accident): No
specific provisions.
After the Accident: An FAA-certified repair station or the manufacturer must
perform inspection and maintenance. Maintenance personnel must be
appropriately rated and must have been trained within previous 5 years on
the aircraft type they are maintaining.

Source: NTSB