U.S. Lawmakers Push Plan to Upgrade 'Black Boxes'

Air Safety Week, July 28, 2003

"We live in a new world of aviation, which includes increased air traffic, increased over water routes, and a heightened threat of terrorism. We must ensure that the black box technology we utilize keeps pace with the growing demands and threats facing commercial aviation," Duncan declared.

Action instead of inaction

He pointed out that the legislation would implement long-standing recommend-ations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Issued in 1999, those recommendations remain unrequited. The recommendations were issued before the crash of the EgyptAir jet but after the Sept. 2, 1998, crash of Swissair Flight 111 in Canada. Lost CVR and FDR data in that crash prompted the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada to call for dual recorders and independent back-up power supplies for assured continuity of data capture (see ASW, March 15, 1999). Those TSB recommendations were endorsed and incorporated by the NTSB in its recommendations.

Four years later, those recommendations remain in an "unacceptable response" status, with an FAA promise to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in late 2001 long past. An FAA official said, "We are currently developing a proposed rulemaking to respond to the [1999] recommendations. While we cannot discuss the details of a rulemaking action in progress, it is accurate to say that the proposed rule has been through extensive executive coordination within the government."

The SAFE Act specifically mentioned the lack of progress on the NTSB's recommendations. It has taken them a step further by adding deployable recorders. Former NTSB Chairman Jim Hall said deployable recorders were not included in the 1999 recommendations because he and other board members were not aware of their existence, and the U.S. military's successful experience with them.

Hall said the SAFE Act features "three R's" of "redundancy, reliability, and resources." Specifically:

Redundancy: The act calls for two pairs of cockpit voice and flight data recorder installations, one pair aft in the airplane, and one pair forward. The forward installation would minimize the potential for lost data from wires being separated further aft. The aft location maximizes survivability of the nondeployable recorders the NTSB had in mind.

Reliability: The act calls for the kind of battery backup the NTSB was seeking in case of loss of aircraft electrical power. The call for a 2-hour recording capability is another aspect of reliability, assuring that important data will not be "taped over" on more limited 30-minute recorders.

Resources: As in the case of federal funding for reinforced cockpit doors, the act provides similar federal dollars for upgraded recorders.

"If the taxpayers are funding operational shortfalls for the airlines, then the federal government can help fund something like this, which is so essential to aviation safety and security," Hall said. Earlier this year, he called for installing deployable recorders in airliners (see ASW, May 12).