Pilot Error and Malfunction Led to June 2006 Crash

Air Safety Week, August 4, 2008

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recently ruled that a pilot's poor decision making and a mechanical malfunction led to a Beech 65-A90- 1 crash two years ago that killed the pilot and seriously injured the co-pilot.

On June 12, 2006, the pilot died and his co-pilot was injured during an emergency landing at the Peter O. Knight Airport on Davis Island, near Tampa, FL. They had been releasing sterilized Mediterranean fruit flies. Their aircraft (N7043G) skidded off the runway, crashed into a home in an upscale island neighborhood and exploded.

According to the NTSB report, the device that controlled the pitch of the turboprop's propellers failed to work properly and the pilot came in too high and too fast and failed to line the plane up with the runway.

The first officer reported that during cruise flight, both propeller secondary low pitch stop (SLPS) lights illuminated, indicating the SLPS system prevented both propellers from going below the low pitch hydraulic mechanical stop. The right occurred first, then the left approximately one minute later. Emergency procedures to correct the condition were ineffective.

The right propeller feathered at some point during the flight, and the first officer reported that while operating single engine, they experienced a problem with the propeller governor.

The flight proceeded direct to an airport with short runways approximately 3.2 nautical miles (nm) northwest of their present position, rather than to an air carrier airport located 8.5 nm away.

The captain entered a close-in right base to runway 35 (2,688 feet long runway), while flying at 155 knots (51 knots above single engine reference speed). He turned onto final approach with the landing gear and flaps retracted, but overshot the runway.

The airplane contacted a taxiway near the departure end of intended runway, and then collided with several obstacles before coming to rest at a house located past the departure end of runway 35. The sole person in the house was not injured.

A postcrash fire consumed the cockpit, cabin, and sections of both wings. Post-accident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of pre-impact failure or malfunction. No determination was made as to the reason for the annunciation of both SLPS lights.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable causes of this accident as: "The poor in-flight planning decision by the captain for his failure to establish the airplane on a stabilized approach for a forced landing, resulting in the airplane landing on a taxiway near the departure end of the runway.

"Contributing to the accident were the failure or malfunction of the primary hydraulic low pitch stop of both propellers for undetermined reasons, the excessive approach airspeed and the failure of the captain to align the airplane with the runway for the forced landing," the Safety Board added.

The Beech 65-A90-1 twin-engine, turboprop was registered to Dynamic AvLease and operated by Dynamic Aviation Group of Bridgewater, VA.

No flight plan was filed. Daylight marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident for the local flight from Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, FL.

The flight dispersed sterile, Mediterranean fruit flies under contract to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and was scheduled to return to SRQ after dispersing was completed. The flight duration was estimated to be slightly over one hour.

The first officer reported that the mission dispersing the fruit flies was uneventful, and while returning to SRQ, "...we got a light on the panel for the [propeller] governor. Possibly for the right engine first." The captain began trouble shooting the right propeller annunciation issue by manipulating the power and propeller controls, and was trying to keep up with it as the right propeller was changing pitch. The same annunciation from the left propeller occurred approximately one minute after the annunciation for the right propeller.

The captain asked him to pull a circuit breaker (CB) located immediately adjacent to his control yoke on the lower instrument panel, but he (first officer) could not recall if this occurred after the first or second annunciation. He also did not recall what CB he pulled, but he pulled the same CB two times at the request of the captain, which had no effect.

The captain was manipulating the power and propeller controls for both engines following the left propeller annunciation, but first officer did not think the captain's actions were having any effect.

At some point the first officer noticed TPF was off their right wingtip and suggested to the captain to proceed there. The captain advised him to contact air traffic control (ATC) and then to declare an emergency. At 1232:39, the first officer contacted Tampa Approach Control (Tampa Approach) and advised that they wanted to fly direct to TPF.