NASA Reissues Aviation Safety Data

Air Safety Week,  Jan 21, 2008  

Tags: NASA

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After receiving 'bad press' from its handling of the release of aviation safety data on Dec. 31, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has updated its National Aviation Operations Monitoring Service (NAOMS) website to add a Microsoft Office Excel formatted version of previously posted files containing pilot survey responses.

The negative media coverage also prompted NASA Administrator Michael Griffin to issue a lengthy message, further explaining his position on the controversial matter.

NASA had posted the survey responses Dec. 31, in Adobe Acrobat PDF format, the U.S. space agency's standard for dissemination of information to the public. After requests for the data in Excel format, Administrator Griffin made an exception to the agency's usual practice.

The initial heavily redacted data and all subsequent data will be published in both Excel and PDF formats on the NASA website.

Re-release of initial data from the $11 million NAOMS project in Excel format should make it easier for researchers to mine the report's findings based on interviews with 30,000 commercial and general aviation pilots. NASA has asked the National Academies of Science to independently evaluate the NAOMS study.

Under congressional pressure, NASA dumped more than 16,000 pages of raw, hard-to-interpret data at the end of last year. NASA had initially denied requests to release the report, saying it "could materially affect the public confidence in and the commercial welfare of the air carriers."

Griffin said NASA erred in its reasoning for originally withholding the data from the public. He also disputes the value of the data since the study "was not properly organized, not properly peer reviewed."

Griffin told reporters in a conference call that NASA has no plans to study the data, saying that is a job for others. He insisted that the NAOMS project simply involved development of aviation safety data collection processes. "The value of the data needs to be determined by the larger aviation community with an operational interest in aviation safety," he stated.

But Griffin also said: "it's hard for me to see any data here that the traveling public would care about, or ought to care about, and it's not for me to prescribe what others ought to care about."

In a message to NASA employees released with word of the space agency's 'about-face' on the matter, Griffin said:

"Many of you have seen the media reports concerning the controversy over our NAOMS project. I have not been pleased with the way this issue has been treated in the press, and I doubt that you have been, either.

"It might be expected that a large, comprehensive dataset concerning a topic as critical as that of aviation safety would attract interest from the public and the media, and this proved to be the case with the NAOMS data.

"NASA received a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by a reporter representing the Associated Press for the data obtained in the NAOMS survey. The present controversy stems from our denial of that request. In response to the appeal letter from the AP, NASA cited concerns for 'public confidence' and for the 'commercial welfare' of air carriers as the supporting basis for the exemption cited in denying the request for the data.

"With that, we gave the unfortunate impression that NASA was putting airline commercial interests ahead of public safety. As I have stated on many occasions, I regret that impression. When the matter was brought to my attention, I corrected it immediately, and publicly stated that we would release the requested data if possible, and as soon as possible. I have made this point many times.

"Some have said that the initial release date of 31 December was chosen because it was a "slow news day". That is not the case. It was the earliest date we could achieve.

"NASA's goal with NAOMS was to develop and demonstrate a capability, and to provide others with the knowledge required to use it, if so desired, over the long term (e.g., as a 'permanent survey'). This was not, and is not, a NASA responsibility.

"Indeed, in a 2002 briefing to senior program management, the NAOMS team requested an extension of funding to 2005, explaining that 'opportunities for hand-off will be explored' in order to accomplish a 'permanent survey.' It was the intention and responsibility of the NAOMS project to transition to an operational entity, and they were provided funds in both FY2005 and FY2006 to do so.

"When the NAOMS project became the subject of public controversy, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate conducted a cursory examination of the data and of the briefings provided by the NAOMS project team. Numerous inconsistencies were found.

"As one example, which I cited in Congressional testimony, the NAOMS team noted a rate of engine failures some four times higher than the accepted value, based on data accumulated over long periods of time by independent means. I am sure I don't have to point out that the aviation community takes engine failures very seriously; the rate of such incidents is considered to be quite well known.