The Threat Of Continuous Smoke

Air Safety Week, Oct 25, 2004

With nothing more than a smoke bomb half the size of a hot dog, a suicidal terrorist could cause a fatal crash by denying the pilot's ability to see, according to a new paper by Aerospace Planning Group, LLC, a Gaithersburg, Md.-based consulting firm. The paper discusses a means for displacing smoke so that pilots can see vital instruments and out the windscreen to safely land their airplane. The emergency smoke-displacing device is found on many corporate jets, VIP military aircraft, on one airline, and on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) and the Department of Homeland Security's own aircraft as an added safety feature (see ASW, Dec. 21, 1998; see also www.evasworldwide.com). The safety aspect stems from the cockpit-filling smoke that can be produced by an electrical malfunction, or by an in-flight fire, effectively blinding pilots even if they are wearing their smoke goggles (the thick smoke reducing vision to a few inches).

However, the terrorist threat of smoke bombs may now have to be considered in the post-9/11 environment, the paper argues. For aircraft certification purposes, current regulations mandate turning off the smoke after the instrument numbers are "indiscernible" and require only that the cockpit ventilation system be able to clear the smoke within three-minutes. However, this standard does not apply to the hazard posed by dense opaque smoke that is generated continuously.

Smoke bombs present such a threat. "For the cost of $5, a terrorist could board an aircraft, easily slipping past security with a smoke bomb that could fill up a DC-10 size airplane three times. Indeed, smoke bombs have already been taken undetected onboard airliners," the paper asserts.

Even if they cause no damage or injury, smoke bombs can and have been used by terrorists because of their intimidating effect on the public's sense of security. "Many smoke bombs are composed of materials that are legal to bring aboard an aircraft and have the nasty characteristic of being impossible to extinguish," the paper declares. Should a terrorist believe it would be difficult to get readily available smoke bombs past security, the recipes for separate (and legal) ingredients for these devices are readily available on the Internet. On one Web site, a writer describes how to make a smoke bomb that "could be used to destroy aircraft." The concept of terrorists bringing separate ingredients on board aircraft has been documented.

Indeed, the potential use of smoke bombs by terrorists was addressed in a 2003 briefing by FAA officials. The key points made in that presentation:

* The flight deck door is the most critical element of flight deck security.

* Eight security issues have been identified by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, Amendment 97 to Annex 8). One deals with flight deck smoke penetration.

* Regarding flight deck smoke penetration, existing rules address smoke evacuation rather than penetration from other occupied areas. A slight positive pressure between the cockpit and cabin is seen as a means of compliance, in which a new rule would require the flight deck to not permit smoke penetration. (Note: Only a few older airliners are able to generate the necessary cockpit pressure to keep smoke from penetrating, according to FAA studies.)

* No current rules address cabin smoke evacuation. Using a rate of air exchange is seen as a means of compliance.

As the paper concludes, "In today's terrorist-invested skies, the requirement to be able to see to land the aircraft under continuous smoke conditions has never been greater."

"When law enforcement wants to get bad guys out of a locked up room, what do they do? They send in smoke bombs. The same principle applies to bad guys wanting to get the good guys out of a locked up flight deck," the paper asserts.

FAA officials were unfamiliar with rulemaking actions to prevent smoke penetration into the cockpit. (For the 2003 FAA briefing, see www.jaa.nl/conference/20th/thematic/Aircraft Security-Beyond th Flight Deck Door.ppt)

New Design Requirements Relating to Security

Applicable to commercial operations involving aircraft with 60 or more passengers

* Least risk bomb location (design): intended to minimize damage, not necessarily eliminate it

* Design to facilitate searches (i.e., focus on making search easier rather than concealment more difficult)

* Least risk bomb location (identification)

* Cargo fire protection

* Flight deck protection

* Separation of vital systems and controls (see ASW, July 29, 2002)

* Flight deck smoke penetration

* Cabin smoke evacuation

Source: ICAO

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