The NTSB's "Most Wanted List" Gets A New Face

Air Safety Week, Dec 4, 2006

Even So, The Board's List Grows Listless

All but one of the most wanted items on the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) list of desired safety improvements are now much older than the FBI's most wanted list of fugitives. Perhaps the FBI would have more success in nailing this seemingly inscrutable catalog of wanton aviation killers.

The fresh new visage on the NTSB's list is the item "Crew Resource Management (CRM) Training for Part 135 Flights". This one has an accident history as well as being an anticipated glitch in the introduction of the burgeoning crop of Very Light Jets (VLJs), such as the Eclipse500, HondaJet, Spectrum 33, Adam 700, Embraer's Phenom 100, Cessna's Mustang, and Diamond's D- Jet.

The number of operators involved with Part 135 operations is anticipated to grow apace because of the expected new direction in personal and business air travel. If it does not, then many firms building the VLJs will have gotten their sums and market projections seriously wrong. If the accident stats in that sector of commercial aviation spikes, no one will be surprised, leastwise the NTSB.

VLJs are jet aircraft weighing 10,000 pounds or less, a distinction from the traditional definition of large aircraft as more than 12,500 pounds, and light aircraft as 12,500 pounds or less. VLJs are certificated for single pilot operations. These aircraft will possess at least some of the following features: (1) advanced cockpit automation such as moving map GPS and multi-function displays; (2) automated engine and systems management; and (3) integrated autoflight, autopilot and flight-guidance systems.

There are two perceived catches hidden among this welter of labor-saving new technology, and they both relate to the human factor. First, applying CRM to a single pilot operation might seem to be a simplistic psych exercise in having the individual develop some self-discipline and recognize his own limits. Second, and stemming from that CRM concern, it has to be realized that VLJ pilots will come from a wide variety of backgrounds and experience.

The National Business Aviation Assn. (NBAA) is urging operators of VLJs "to utilize the resources of a mentor pilot program until such time as they have acquired the necessary skills and proficiency for safe operation in all flight regimes."

The NBAA has formed a VLJ Working Group Safety Committee to formulate training guidelines and sought input from VLJ manufacturers, the FAA, training organizations and insurance underwriters. They have turned out a curriculum that seeks to mitigate the identified risks and term the one-sided (and obviously subjective) single pilot CRM scenario as "Single Pilot Resource Management" (SRM).

Because safety will be paramount for the ongoing reputation of this new wave of jet operators, stakeholders are understandably concerned that the FAA seems to be dragging its feet. It's won the NTSB's laggard's award with a show- time entry of "timeliness classification: Unacceptable".

Critics of the VLJ concept argue that basic economics, demographics, industry inertia and operational constraints will automatically limit the birth of an air taxi industry. They see the massive infrastructure investment in the new style air transport system as so much vaporware. For them, aviation advancements have always been evolutionary, not revolutionary.

Traditional charter operators are sitting back, looking bemused and, not wanting to be perceived as Luddites, saying very little. They have, after all, reworked their sums again and again over the years, trying to polish their bottom lines. Few of them see the promised new technology and economics of VLJ operations stealing passengers away from traditional carriers.

It is hard to decide which factor could be a VLJ Achilles Heel. Will it be the ability of ATC to cope with a new swarm of fast-moving tiny blips? Will it be the availability of passengers to fill the planes at the fares charged? Will it be all the contingency costs of training, equipping and retaining a pilot? Where will simulator training stand eventually? Will some VLJs be more successful than others? What will their serviceability and maintenance costs be like? How will utilization figure in the bottom line? What distinctive aspect will have the most passenger appeal? Having a toilet on board? Which VLJ manufacturers will crump?

All the unknowns are being shoved aside as the FAA accepts and endorses what some pundits call a myth as being the new reality. It may be just wishful thinking by the movement within the FAA that wants a "user pays" system for the reorganizing ATC corps. Despite all the uncertainty, one projection will prevail and that is the safety record. If the VLJ record is scarred by an early learning curve of incidents and accidents, the hoped for paying passengers will stay away in droves and insurability will become a determining cost-factor.

Because of this concern, the NBAA has determined that, dependent on a potential VLJ pilot's background, an Initial Operating Experience (IOE) minimum may be necessary. The broad guideline is as follows: