Current Regulatory Activity

Air Safety Week, Dec 15, 2003

ASW note: Two items below are of particular and sweeping significance: The
Dec. 9 notice dealing with fuel tank inerting, and the Nov. 14 notice
dealing with extended operations (ETOPS).
Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 9 Notice of Proposed
Special Conditions, Flammability Reduction System (Fuel Tank Inerting) Docket
No. NM270 Concerns fuel system safety and inerting of center wing tank (CWT)
on B747 aircraft, both classics and -400 series.  (Dec. 9 entry continued)
Summary of Situation: FAA seeks industry comments on a system to inert the
flammable vapors in the CWT of B747 aircraft. From the reading of this
23-page notice, similar action is likely to follow on other aircraft with
heated center wing tanks (e.g., air conditioning packs located under the CWT),
notably the B737, B757, B767 and B777. Although not mentioned, don't
rule out some Airbus models (CWT testing is under way on an A320 at the FAA
Technical Center). FAA concedes openly in this document that "ignition
source prevention alone has not been totally effective at preventing
accidents," that "regulations do not contain adequate ...
standards," and that recent safety reviews revealed a "significant
number of single and combinations of failures that can result in ignition
sources within the fuel tanks." Obviously, although not being stated,
in order to remove all ignition hazards, not only would electrical currents
introduced into the tanks have to be totally isolated, but the conductive
silver-sulfide deposits also would need to
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 23, 2004. Note: comment period
is limited. This notice is a significant development in the saga of improving
fuel system safety since the 1996 CWT explosion of TWA Flight 800, a B747
Classic. The FAA is proposing 8 major "special conditions" to
certify the inerting system: 1. Must meet 3% exposure based on 1 million
flight Monte Carlo analysis. 2. Must inert for ground and climb phases on
days 80[bar] F and warmer. 3. Nitrogen enriched air must inert all portions
of the tank (i.e., no portions of, say, a compartmented tank can contain
explosive vapors). 4. Inerting system functional status indications must be
accessible for checking by maintenance personnel or flightcrew. 5. Byproduct
oxygen-enriched air must not create a hazard. 6. Maintenance program must
be provided with system. 7. Method of collecting reliability data must be
presented. 8. Quarterly reports must be provided to FAA of system
performance/reliability for first 5 years after service introduction.
It is important to observe what

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 8 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) Docket No. 2003-NM-82-AD
Summary of Situation: B747s equipped with faulty fire extinguisher bottles.
Fractured discharge heads could cause uncontrolled engine or auxiliary power
unit (APU) fire that could spread to strut, wing or to aircraft structure.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 22, 2004 Points to potential
need for suppression systems to handle wing tank inerting.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 8 NPRM Docket No.
2002-NM-305-AD
Summary of Situation: B777 fuel boost pumps. Replace socket contacts to
forestall potential ignition source and fuel tank explosion. Could result in
undetected and uncontrollable fire in wheel well or wing trailing edge.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 22, 2004 Another potential
fuel system explosion.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 5 NPRM Docket No.
2002-NM-215-AD
Summary of Situation: DC-9 through MD-88 series twinjets. Faulty ribbon
heaters in lavatory water lines could lead to arcing and fire.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 20, 2004 Faulty ribbon heater
the culprit in May 13, 2002, Air Canada B767 belly hold fire (see ASW, June
10, 2002).

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 5 NPRM Docket No.
2003-CE-45-AD
Summary of Situation: Pilatus PC-12/45 Fuel leakage from engine-driven pump
could cause fire in the engine compartment.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 6, 2004 Replacement with
improved design.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 4 Final rule Docket
No. 2003-NM-70-AD
Summary of Situation: MD-11. Chafing of power feeder cables in aft galley
area, with potential for arcing, smoke, fire.
Action Date & Comments: Effective Jan. 8, 2004. Fix within 6 mos. More
MD-11 electrical problems. (See ASW, Oct. 27, bottom of p. 6 for summary
of AD activity fixing deficient MD-11 electricals.)

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 4 Final rule Docket
No. 2003-NM-68-AD
Summary of Situation: MD-11. Chafing of power feeder cables in No. 3 bay
electrical power center with potential for arcing, smoke and fire.
Action Date & Comments: Effective Jan. 8, 2004 A2002-17-06 refers. 112
aircraft affected. More MD-11 electrical problems.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 4 NPRM Docket No.
2002-NM-183-AD
Summary of Situation: A319 and A320. Inspect and correct fatigue cracks in
wing/fuselage joint fittings.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 5, 2004 AD 98-04-49 refers.
Shortens inspection interval based on higher than originally estimated
flight loads. FAA action follows that of French authorities.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 4 Final rule Docket
No. 2000-NM-150-AD
Summary of Situation: DC-9 through MD-88 series twinjets. Inspect and correct
wiring discrepancies to prevent smoke and fire. 1,191 airplanes affected.
Action Date & Comments: Effective Jan. 8, 2004 Bad wiring - a continuing
threat. FAA rejects suggested 6 mo. to 1-year compliance time, hewing to
original 6-yr schedule.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 4 NPRM Docket No.
2002-NM-327-AD
Summary of Situation: B737 Next Generation. Check for adequate electrical
current to discharge Halon, necessary to prevent uncontrolled engine fire.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 20, 2004. Manufacturing defect.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 4 NPRM Docket No.
2002-NM-233-AD
Summary of Situation: Falcon 2000. Prevent fuel leakage onto "hot"
section of the engine and consequent uncontained fire.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 5, 2004. Apparent
manufacturing defect.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 3 Supplemental
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) Docket No. 2001-NM-301-AD
Summary of Situation: A319 and A320. Lightning could travel to fuel quantity
indication probes, creating arcing to structure and fuel tank explosion.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Dec. 29. Inspect clearance of probes
to structure.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Dec. 3 NPRM Docket No.
2003-NM-93-AD
Summary of Situation: B747-400. Prevent chafing and hole in fire
extinguishing tube that could result in lack of fire suppressing agent and
consequent uncontained fire in aft cargo compartment.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 20, 2004. Extended operations
(ETOPS) are predicated on being able to contain such fires (see Nov. 14 item
below).

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Nov. 28 NPRM Docket No.
2002-NM-292-AD
Summary of Situation: MD-11 passenger and freighter models. Prevent fuel
leakage and possible ignition in tail tank.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 12, 2004. Relates to ETOPS.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Nov. 25 NPRM Docket No.
2003-NM-50-AD
Summary of Situation: B777-200. Inspect wire bundles for possible contact
with galley water drain tube. To prevent undesired stabilizer motion and
loss of pitch control.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 9, 2004. B777 is a major
player in ETOPS, operating up to 207 min. from divert airfields.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Nov. 17 NPRM Docket No.
2002-NM-153-AD
Summary of Situation: A319 and A320. Prevent overheating of fuel probes and
consequent fire/explosion in center fuel tank.
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Dec. 17. Fuel system safety; see
Dec. 9 item above.

Date posted on Federal Register and Document Type: Nov. 14 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-Engine Airplanes Docket No.
FAA-2002-6717 NPRM addresses scheduled and unscheduled carriers, to include
on-demand charter and corporate/business operations.
Summary of Situation: Proposal cleans up and consolidates a longstanding
regulatory patchwork surrounding ETOPS. NPRM extends ETOPS requirements
previously applicable only to twinjets, to now include three and four-engine
aircraft. NPRM incorporates March 2001 FAA guidance on polar operations into
the ETOPS regimen (see ASW, March 5, 2001). NPRM codifies the philosophy for
ETOPS: to prevent the need for diversions in the first place, but to protect
the viability of a divert in the remote chance it should be necessary. NPRM
requires operators to have a passenger recovery plan in effect as a
precondition for ETOPS flights, to include for non-scheduled operators. ....
The document outlines 3 basic contingency scenarios: *One engine
inoperative, or *Rapid decompression, or *Decompression and simultaneous
engine failure. On-board fire is considered, but not linked to loss of an
engine. Loss of #2 engine on Swissair MD-11 that crashed at Halifax in 1998
may have been related to fire damage (Canadian investigators said in their
final repo
Action Date & Comments: Comments due Jan. 13, 2004 Note: A limited 60-day
comment period. The basis for this NPRM is a report on ETOPS submitted
earlier this year by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (see ASW,
Jan. 13). This report discussed engine reliability in detail. Consider,
however, the following statistics: *The ARAC report runs to 92,414 words.
*The word "fire" is used 81 times. *The word "smoke" is
used 1 time. A recent analysis of airline service difficulty reports by Capt.
Jim Shaw found that during the cruise phase of flight "smoke"
events are more than twice as likely to cause unscheduled landings as
engine problems (see ASW, Oct. 20). Fire and smoke mitigation may
warrant more attention. For example, the NPRM does not address a scenario
wherein a belly hold fire leads to burnthrough of the pressurized hull and
resulting decompression. The NPRM also does not address the problem posed by
electrically related fires in those inaccessible spaces not protected by
smoke/fire detection and suppression. NPRM goes beyo

Source: Federal Register