Fatal Flaws Should be Fixed, Families of Air Crash Victims Urge

Air Safety Week, Feb 12, 2001

Less time and more money is needed to fix known safety deficiencies in airliners, according to one Tom O'Mara, a member of the National Air Disaster Alliance (NADA).

O'Mara addressed the first full meeting of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) in ten years, which took place last week. NADA is one of the organizations represented on the ARAC executive committee. O'Mara lost his only child, 24-year old Heather, in the fatal 1989 crash of a United Airlines [UAL] ?? at Sioux City, Iowa, after a ruptured disk in the tail-mounted engine severed lines for all three of the airplane's hydraulic systems. At the time an executive with The Wall Street Journal newspaper, O'Mara was stunned to read a headline in the paper two days after his daughter's body was found on the tarmac about a lurking "Achilles Heel" in the DC-10. The article dealt with the absence of so-called "hydraulic fuses" to prevent the complete loss of fluid that occurred in this accident.

"This was the first time I ever considered that the aviation industry or its regulator might not fix fatal flaws on their aircraft," O'Mara told the ARAC. "I met families from other plane crashes, and I'm sorry to say that I learned what we all know - there are fixable fatal flaws on commercial jets that are not fixed."

In abridged form, O'Mara made the following argument:

* "Here's what the families of air disasters asked me to convey to you this morning: We understand that accidents happen. We know that 40,000 have perished on commercial plane crashes since 1960, roughly 1,000 deaths per year. We know this is a low number, compared to the number of those killed by cars, guns and heart attacks."

* "However, we don't accept that NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) 'recommendations' should be ignored by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the industry for years, even decades."

* "If the FAA or Douglas had fixed all the fatal flaws facing the DC-10 after that first crash at Orly, France in 1974, Heather and 110 others would not have been killed at Sioux City. Why? The Turkish DC-10 crashed at Orly due to total loss of hydraulic power. The cargo door popped open, the floor buckled, and the hydraulic lines under the floor snapped. Precious hydraulic fluids were pumped out of the lines. All died."

* "If ARAC or Douglas had put a 'safety valve' - a $10,000 item back then - on hydraulic lines to all three engines after Orly, United's Capt. Al Haines would not have faced the same 'total hydraulic power loss' 15 years later, when one of his three engines 'let go.' "

* "Please remember that ARAC members can prevent families from getting mugged twice when a plane crashes. The first mugging is the crash. The second mugging is discovering that their loved ones did not have to die."

In this regard, O'Mara offered two suggestions. "These two actions by FAA and industry would soothe those of us who mourn the loss of lived ones killed in predictable, foreseeable, and preventable plane crashes," he said.

"As you conduct your ARAC debates on safety, the families wanted me to remind you," O'Mara added, "that only chance puts us in our shoes, and you in yours. We've seen what happens when 'proven dangers' are not fixed in a timely fashion."

He urged the members present that ARAC "can be the dike that holds back the sea of sorrow." >> O'Mara, e-mail tomomara@progworks.net <<

Our members offer two suggestions for safer skies...

* Move quicker implementing safety recommendations. The FAA should require all NTSB recommendations, published as part of a final accident report, to be implemented within 18 months. Sooner would be fine. We know the industry feels this is a draconian measure. Not needed. Too expensive. Too difficult, etc. We've heard it all. Think about it. That's all we ask. (See related brief, where the NTSB calls for action, not within 5 years, but at the 'earliest maintenance opportunity')

* Establish a safety "fix" fund. We ask you to use the influence of your companies to get Congress to create a "Fix Trust Fund." This "Fix Fund" would pay the airlines to implement NTSB recommendations. It could be funded by a $1 surcharge per ticket issued in the U.S. Based on projections of passenger traffic growth, nearly $1 billion could be harvested for this purpose by 2005, and beyond. We suggest that management of the "Fix Fund" be assigned to someone outside of the aviation industry. Furthermore, we don't want the "Fix Fund" used to balance the nation's books, like the Aviation Trust Fund was used on occasion.