A BA 747 Crosses The Safety Rubicon — Or Did It?

Air Safety Week, Feb 28, 2005

On Feb. 20, a British Airways [BAB] 747 (Flight 268 en route from Los Angeles to Heathrow) diverted itself to Manchester after declaring a Mayday for being short on fuel. Bearing in mind that Manchester isn't that far short of Heathrow after a continental USA and Transatlantic crossing and that the UK weather wasn't bad, what could have caused this last minute diversion? It would appear that the aircraft was advised by LAX air traffic control (ATC) just after departure that it was trailing 20 feet of flame from its #2 engine. Probably a surge, so it was given the rest of the day off. But the BA crew, with three good engines, decided to plow onward across the Atlantic. This is not uncommon for British Airways.

It had been done by another BA crew out of LAX last November in similar circumstances -- thereby creating, or rather maintaining, a reliable precedent. Indeed, many other airlines would also rather keep heading for a "home-base" than dumping tons of fuel, creating scheduling havoc and necessitating a later non-revenue three-engine ferry back to a maintenance base. Think of the loss of utilization involved; the aircraft could be out of service for up to a week.

But there may have been another reason. The incident happened three days after a European regulation came into force requiring airlines to compensate passengers for long delays or cancellations. Under the new rules, if the pilot had returned to Los Angeles, BA would have been facing a passenger compensation payout of more than GBP100,000 (US$191,465), on top of a whole swag of other costs. The EU regulation, which carriers consider punitive, requires airlines to refund passengers the full cost of their tickets as well as flying them home if a delay lasts longer than five hours.

The greatest risk in a three-engine ferry flight is the three-engine takeoff, even though it is regularly done for reasons of economics. So heading off on a nine-hour Translant on three donks in a 747 is not really breaking new ground. However, not having declared any sort of emergency, the crew was left a little flat-footed when Oceanic then lumbered them with a non-optimal flight level and fuel started looking a bit tight in the headwinds at the assigned level.

As he approached Blighty, the pilot deemed it advisable to declare a PAN or Mayday as he further discovered that some of the fuel on board was inaccessible. This advisory signified to ATC that he had a minor problem and would appreciate their earnest cooperation. At some later stage he then wisely, as it turned out, opted for the nearer airfield. Passing 4,000 feet in the descent, the pucker factor increased and he upped his alert phase to a Mayday once resident on a more discreet VHF frequency of 121.350MHZ. He asked for a sterile runway and stated that he had insufficient fuel even for a go-round at Manchester. 200 kg/min is the consumption figure in the landing configuration and they'd only have 2,000 kg to spend on arrival -- so all resoundingly good decisions. His bid for attention thus duly noted, the ATC slot auctioneer declared the Manchester priority slot sold to the gent with the high-pitched voice -- and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

But it does demonstrate how an accident chain can build, with one of the classic links being the "best of intentions" and another being the standard set by the airline. After all, ETOPS (extended range operations) doesn't yet rule in the four-engine world. So it's not even bending the rules if you opt to press on rewardless, with or without company consensus. Many pilots have been caught out by similar decisions becoming derailed. But even though they might overspeed their circular slide-rules en route, and overstress their worry beads, as long as all the factors are known and factored in, what could possibly go wrong? Suddenly finding out that fuel below a certain level won't transfer could have been a sudden reintroduction to the real world of "Numpty."

Numpty's Rule states that if there's something vital that you don't know, you are eventually destined to find out at the worst possible moment. But then again, not knowing the details of the dead #2's fuel tank inaccessibility via the override/jettison pumps at fuel levels lower than three tons, it may have been Murphy's Law in play here (if anything can go wrong it will, at the worst possible time). If so, then it may turn out to be a simple case of disregarded terminal conjunctivitis. That is the condition wherein a pilot stares at his conjunctiva (the inside membrane of the eyelid), concludes that he cannot see the light at the end of the tunnel, and resolves not to traverse said tunnel. You never press on with your eyes shut to the possibilities. There's much to be said for not entering the Kingdom of Unseen Peril. In that realm even the aircraft cleaner is allowed to question your flawless decision-making, using his 20:20 hindsight. But it's OK if your plan is endorsed and that's the beauty of modern comms. But were the 351 passengers impressed? What were they told? Putting on our Flight Simulator 2000 BA PR hats here, we will hazard a guess. Come in spinner. "Landing with 2T useable (and 3T suddenly unusable) after crossing the continental USA and the Atlantic is a fine feat of airmanship. No one could cut it any finer."