Clear and Present Danger

Air Safety Week, March 3, 2003

U.S. airlines must start equipping their aircraft with missile defense systems not later than Dec. 31, 2003, if legislation recently introduced in Congress is passed into law. Dubbed the Commercial Airline Missile Defense Act (S.311), the legislation was sponsored by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Steve Israel (D-N.Y.). Boxer said the threat against U.S. airliners cannot be discounted.

At a press conference, Schumer and Israel pointed to LaGuardia airport as an example of an airport located in an urban area that provides terrorists with the opportunity to fire portable missiles surreptitiously against low-flying aircraft and to drive off undetected. Until aircraft can be retrofitted, the act calls for the president to deploy National Guard troops and U.S. Coast Guard assets to patrol areas around airports as protection against surface-to-air missile attacks on airliners.

The bill requires the secretary of transportation to fund the defensive equipment, estimated to cost $1 million per airliner. It leaves to the secretary the type of defensive equipment to be deployed. However, ejectable flares to foil heat-seeking missiles do not seem to be the preferred technology, as they would pose a potential hazard if used over populated areas. In her remarks introducing the bill, Boxer referred to sensors to warn of an incoming missile "and a laser or [infrared] lamp to fool the missile's guidance system."

"They work automatically without any action by the pilots," she declared.

However effective they may be against heat-seeking missiles, flares and infrared lights might not defeat weapons like the Swedish-built RBS-70 "Ray Rider." An optically guided missile, the gunner holds a laser built into the launch apparatus onto the desired aim point on the aircraft, and the missile homes on the laser's reflected energy (hence the term "Ray Rider"). A significant number of these weapons were sold to Iran, and some may have fallen into the hands of terrorists.

Performance of anti-missile systems aside, the legislation raises a number of significant issues. With some 4,000 large transports in service, the program portends a cost of $4 billion just for the hardware. Installation and maintenance costs, funding for which is not identified in the bill, would add to that figure. Recall that the Transportation Department's Inspector General has already warned that a real funding crunch is looming on aviation security programs already under way. It is widely believed that El Al airliners are equipped with missile defense systems, but as a state carrier, the Israeli government supports funding. Boxer and colleagues suggested taking the necessary funding for hardware from President Bush's strategic missile defense project.

A host of related issues come to mind:

* What alerts and displays might be needed in the cockpit, and would pilots also have to be trained in evasive tactics?

* Will the airlines support a specialist at every airport to maintain these systems which, by the way, might feature classified technology? Will such technicians have to be licensed? Will they command some sort of premium pay?

* Will these systems be a MMEL [master minimum equipment list] item? If missile defenses are determined to be a safety of flight item, rather than a safety enhancing feature, then redundancy will be required (i.e., two defense suites, with the added weight and complexity issues involved).

* Will missile defense systems installed in underwing pods, in engine pylons, or in the tailcone, have to be shielded against electromagnetic interference (EMI), and will their electrical wiring have to be chafe-resistant? Installation configurations would require supplemental type certificate (STC) approval for each aircraft model, and maybe even separate STCs for the same model aircraft operated by different carriers (aircraft configurations can vary to meet the unique needs of respective purchasers).

* Will the concept be subjected to the dictates of a cost-benefit analysis? If so, this thought comes to mind: rather than opening the Pandora's box of missile defense systems on airliners, consider inerting of wing and center tanks. The military does so for the express purpose of minimizing the destructiveness of surface-to-air missiles. By expanding the inerting of center wing tanks - the current focus in the Federal Aviation Administration - to include the wing tanks, in lieu of installing missile defense, a two-for-one benefit results: safety and security. Safety against errant ignition sources in the tank, and security against exploding missile warheads.

'A Real and Recognized Threat'

Sen. Boxer, Feb. 22 remarks (extracts):

"Last November two shoulder-fired SA-7 missiles were launched at an Israeli airliner as it took off from a Kenyan airport. While these missiles missed their target, they are a clear example of an ever-growing threat to all air travel. A similar incident occurred last May when a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia was believed to [have been] fired upon, also with an SA-7 missile. Saudi authorities later found an empty launch tube near an airbase used by American aircraft.