U.S. editorial excerpts -3-

0 Comments | Asian Political News, March 31, 2008

NEW YORK, March 24 Kyodo

Selected editorial excerpts from the U.S. press:

SADDAM'S TERROR LINKS (The Wall Street Journal, New York)

Five years on, few Iraq myths are as persistent as the notion that the Bush Administration invented a connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. Yet a new Pentagon report suggests that Iraq's links to world-wide terror networks, including al Qaeda, were far more extensive than previously understood.

Naturally, it's getting little or no attention. Press accounts have been misleading or outright distortions, while the Bush Administration seems indifferent. Even John McCain has let the study's revelations float by. But that doesn't make the facts any less notable or true.

The redacted version of ''Saddam and Terrorism'' is the most definitive public assessment to date from the Harmony program, the trove of ''exploitable'' documents, audio and video records, and computer files captured in Iraq. On the basis of about 600,000 items, the report lays out Saddam's willingness to use terrorism against American and other international targets, as well as his larger state sponsorship of terror, which included harboring, training and equipping jihadis throughout the Middle East.

''The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's 'coercion' toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power,'' the authors conclude. Throughout the 1990s, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) cooperated with Hamas; the Palestine Liberation Front, which maintained a Baghdad office; Force 17, Yasser Arafat's private army; and others. The IIS gave commando training for members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the organization that assassinated Anwar Sadat and whose ''emir'' was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who became Osama bin Laden's second-in-command when the group merged with al Qaeda in 1998.

At the very least the report should dispel the notion that outwardly ''secular'' Saddam would never consort with religious types like al Qaeda. A pan-Arab nationalist, Saddam viewed radical Islamists as potential allies, and they likewise. According to a 1993 memo, Saddam decided to ''form a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil; especially Somalia,'' where al Qaeda was then working with warlords against U.S. humanitarian forces.

The Pentagon report cites this as ''a tactical example'' of their cooperation. When Saddam ''was ordering action in Somalia aimed at the American presence, Osama bin Laden was doing the same thing.'' Saddam took an interest in ''far-flung terrorist groups . . . to locate any organization whose services he might use in the future.'' The Harmony documents ''reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda -- as long as that organization's near-term goals supported Saddam's long-term version.''

For 20 years, such ''support'' included using Fedayeen Saddam training camps to school terrorists, especially Palestinians but also non-Iraqis ''directly associated'' with al Qaeda, continuing up to the fall of Baghdad. Saddam also provided financial support and weapons, amounting to ''a state-directed program of significant scale.'' In July 2001, the regime began patronizing a terror cartel in Bahrain calling itself the Army of Muhammad, which, according to an Iraqi memo, ''is under the wings of bin Laden.''

It's true that the Pentagon report found no ''smoking gun,'' i.e., a direct connection on a joint Iraq-al Qaeda operation. Supposedly this vindicates the view that Iraq's liberation was launched on false premises. But the Administration was always cautious, with Colin Powell alleging merely a ''sinister nexus'' in his 2003 U.N. speech. If anything, sinister is an understatement. The main Iraq intelligence failure was over WMD, but the report indicates that the CIA also underestimated Saddam's ties to global terror cartels.

The Administration has always maintained that Iraq is just one front in the war on terror; and the report offers ''evidence of logistical preparation for terrorist operations in other nations, including those in the West.'' In 2002, an IIS memo explained to Saddam that Iraqi embassies were stockpiling weapons, while many of the terrorists trained in Fedayeen camps were dispatched to London with counterfeit documents, where they circulated throughout Europe.

Around the same time, the IIS began to manufacture better improvised explosive devices ''designed to be used in civilian areas,'' and the regime bureaucratized suicide operations, with local Baath Party leaders competing to provide recruits for Saddam as part of a ''Martyrdom Project.''

All of these are inconvenient facts for those who want to assert that somehow Saddam could have been easily contained and presented no threat to the U.S. The Harmony files buttress the case that the decision to oust Saddam was the right one -- which makes it all the more puzzling that the Bush Administration is mum. It isn't the first time the White House has ceded the Iraq debate to its opponents.