Japanese editorial excerpts -3-

Japan Policy & Politics, July 22, 2003

TOKYO, July 21 Kyodo

Selected editorial excerpts from the Japanese press:

SDF DISPATCH TO IRAQ (IHT/Asahi as translated from the Japanese-language Asahi Shimbun's editorial published July 20)

Deliberations in the Upper House of the Diet on the special measures bill for the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to Iraq are moving into their final stage. As this comes to pass, there is an increasingly obvious threat that Japan will in fact be sending SDF troops into potential combat zones, rather than the widely-portrayed image of having them play a supporting role largely out of harm's way.

The U.S. commander in Iraq has effectively recognized that, in military terminology, the current situation in that country amounts to ''guerrilla warfare.'' In a reply to questioning at the Diet, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was also forced to admit that the level of safety in Iraq leaves much to be desired.

Even in the vicinity of Baghdad airport, which was supposed to be one of the safest areas and envisioned for use in SDF airlifts, a surface-to-air missile has been launched at an American aircraft.

Not surprisingly, qualms about the dispatch plan have surfaced in the Japanese government, and even within the ruling parties. Even if the bill gains passage this month, the current thinking is that the actual dispatching of troops will not occur in late October, as originally envisioned, but rather from November on.

Then again, the potential danger in Iraq is not the only reason for the calls to delay any rush to troop commitment. Keeping a close eye on the trends linked to the general election coming up in November, another clear factor is the reckoning of the various interests involved against this backdrop.

Simply stated, if SDF troops were to become entangled in actual combat and suffer casualties prior to the casting of the ballots, the government parties could not avoid taking a hit. The logic is that while troops will most likely be dispatched, the most prudent approach is to wait until after the election is history.

There have been a number of unreasonable justifications to support the idea of sending troops to Iraq from the very beginning. Koizumi is fully aware of this, and reached the conclusion that the facts and logic favored the early dispatch of SDF personnel. The strength of the prime minister's resolve on this issue was reflected in his rhetoric, in which he explained the need to understand that troops in Iraq ''might be killed or be forced to kill,'' as well as acknowledging that there are areas of Iraq in which dangers exist.

A candid approach, it appeared. But now it seems that the idea is to put off any dispatch until after the election, for fear that the issue might become the focus of contention in the scramble to win votes. As a policy shift, this is blatantly self-serving to say the least.

The much-hyped weapons of mass destruction that were used as a major pretense for attacking Iraq in the first place have yet to be found. Even within the U.S. administration, blame is beginning to be passed around surrounding responsibility for the exaggerated threats that the Iraq under Saddam posed to the world.

India had pondered the idea of dispatching a large number of troops to Iraq, but has recently backed down from that stance out of deference to the position of the United Nations. Setting aside the problems of footing the massive bill for such a policy, this decision was also a reflection of the prevailing caution in Indian public opinion.

Standing in sharp contrast to this is Koizumi, who immediately rushed to assure the world that Japan was ready and willing to commit SDF personnel. As it appears now, the key motive in that move was the strong desire to put on a ''good face'' for Washington. Yet at the same time, there is another audience for which the Koizumi camp also needs to don an equally ''good face.'' That audience is Japanese public opinion.

In a frantic attempt to somehow make these two ''good faces'' compatible, Tokyo has cooked up its own special logic on the sphere of activities to be undertaken by the SDF in Iraq. This includes limiting personnel operations to so-called ''noncombat zones,'' as well as declaring that the troops will be dispatched not to fight but to ''assist in rebuilding Iraq.'' Here again, though, the limits of such a balancing act are becoming painfully clear.

U.S. forces are coming under frequent attack in the north of Baghdad. This is an area that the U.S. government originally suggested as a possible location for SDF support operations. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda has also voiced reservations about committing troops to that part of Iraq, noting that such a mission would be ''difficult under the current conditions.''

On one hand, Koizumi finds himself unable to respond to the requests posed by the U.S. government. On the other, he finds it essential to devote serious attention to the negative impact that SDF commitment could have on the upcoming general election. We respectfully suggest the beleaguered prime minister pull the current bill from the table, and set about the task of retooling Japan's Iraq support policy in a direction that will truly contribute to improving the conditions there.