FAA Security Audit Was Planned For Day After Attack

World Airline News, Sept 14, 2001

In a bizarre coincidence, the chief watchdog of the Department of Transportation (DOT) was scheduled to begin an audit of U.S. aviation security the day after the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history occurred. The audit is part of a continuing effort to monitor improvements to the aviation security system.

A source with the DOT's Office of Inspector General (OIG) said that a team of auditors had been assembled in Washington, D.C, and had planned to hold their first meeting with Federal Aviation Administration officials Sept. 12. Needless to say, this meeting has been postponed due to the current crises that is occupying all of the agency's attention.

The OIG made the audit announcement on Aug. 24. In the announcment notice, the OIG told the FAA that the purpose of the audit is to assess the FAA's efforts in improving passenger and carry-on baggage screening at checkipoints. Specifically, it was intended to evaluate all policy and planning requirements, the deployment of new technology, the use of systems and equipment, the maintenance of equipment, training and measuring screener performance, and inspection and enforcement.

The audit is the latest action in the OIG's oversight of FAA security policies. One of the prime goals was assessing what progress had been made in implementing the directives contained in the Airport Security Act of 2000, which was introduced last October by former Senate aviation subcommittee Chairwoman Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX).

After an earlier audit, OIG assistant inspector general Alexis Stefani said that some of the industry's current safety initiatives need refining. She said this and other recent audits have found many shortcomings in critical equipment, techniques and personnel.

The OIG audit findings and recommendations include:

* Finding: The testing of the new checked baggage security process needs to be expanded. Multiple failures occurred during passenger profiling, baggage screening or threat resolution. In a high percentage of tests, the operator did not even identify or look for threat items that were indicated by the machines.

* Recommendation: The DOT should develop and execute a plan that includes comprehensive assessments and aggressive realistic testing to evaluate the operational effectiveness of automated passenger profiling system, explosives detection equipment and operators.

* Finding: Air carrier compliance with Positive Passenger Bag-Matching (PPBM) requirements need improving.

* Recommendation: Continued frequent testing of air carriers' compliance with PPBM requirements and take enforcement actions against carriers that have a pattern of noncompliance.

* Finding: Airport operators and air carriers had not successfully implemented procedures for controlling security access.

* Recommendation: The DOT will work with airport operators and air carriers to implement and strengthen existing controls, such as increased lighting, shorten door closing times, and increase the distance between public areas and access control points.

* Finding: Employees often did not meet their responsibilities for airport security.

* Recommendation: Require airport operators and air carriers to develop and implement comprehensive training programs that teach employees what their role in airport security is, the importance of their participation, how their performance will be evaluated and what action will be taken if they fail to perform.

* Finding: FAA's background investigation requirements for issuing airport identification do not provide assurance that individuals can be trusted with public safety. First, the 12-month gap of employment trigger is too long. Department of Justice (DOJ) statistics for 1999 show that 61 percent of all state and federal felony convictions resulted in probation or jail time of only six months - half the time required in the applicant background check.

Second, the list of 25 disqualifying crimes is too short. During a recent Federal Bureau of Investigation sting operation at Miami International Airport, 14 of 53 employees arrested for smuggling contraband onboard commercial aircraft had criminal records for non-disqualifying felonies such as larceny, battery, possession of drugs and credit card fraud.

* Recommendations: The DOT will strengthen background investigation requirements to include initial and randomly recurring FBI criminal checks for all employees. Secondly, the DOT favors expanding the crimes that disqualify an individual from unescorted access to secure airport areas.

* Finding: The DOT found no quantitative basis for determining where bulk explosives detection equipment would be most effectively used.

* Recommendation: Conduct a DOT analysis of the number of enplanements, the number of selectees, and the number of selectee checked bags, by carriers and station, to determine whether the deployment of certified bulk explosives detection machines at any specific location is justified.

* Finding: While bulk explosives detection equipment is being deployed, there has been no significant increase in Computer Tomography X-ray (CTX) average usage rates. Indeed, the majority of deployed and operational machines do not screen as many bags in a full day of operation as the machine is certified to screen in an hour.