Endgame for the Northern Forest? - forest management controversy on Northern Forest of New England and New York - Cover Story

American Forests, March-April, 1993 by Carl Reidel

Gridlock between contending interests is dimming the once-bright promise of an innovative blueprint for the stewardship of 25 million coveted acres from the Adirondacks to Maine.

Three years ago I described the dramatic events reshaping the Northern Forest of New England and New York as "a true story of yuppie robber barons, an English knight, governors and senators, scientific studies, and riotous hearings where 'Mr. Cougar' and 'Ms. Owl' testify alongside corporate officers." (see American Forests May/June 1990).

It was a "tale still unfolding," I said in the spring of 1990, warning that there were some very tough questions yet to be answered by the people of the region. And I predicted that if we failed to respond to those critical issues soon, we would be "handing our future to knights and knaves who know well the present market value of our heritage." Today, I can add, time is clearly running out for the region and its people.

The issues in 1993, as then, are political hot potatoes. Sparked by the sale of former Diamond International Corporation lands in 1988--lands acquired in a 1982 hostile takeover by Sir James Goldsmith--Congress and the four state governors involved quickly launched a major study and established the Governors' Task Force. Spurred on by predictions that the Diamond lands breakup was just the beginning of a domino-like collapse of the existing land-ownership pattern of large private forest-products corporations, government and private organizations joined in an unprecedented joint effort.

While there were calls by some for immediate large-scale public land acquisition, most of those initially involved in the newly formed Governors' Task Force were convinced of the need to find a new policy context for addressing the controversial, complex, and rapidly changing issues in the region. They believed that new context had to be an innovative public-private cooperative approach. Neither the old citadel-style National Park model nor Adam Smith's arthritic invisible hand with its myopic vision offered a clear view into the future. We were optimistic that there was a better path.

But crafting a viable public-private approach proved more daunting than anyone had imagined. Though the U.S. Forest Service's Northern Forest Study team and those of us on the Governors' Task Force were able to forge a "shared vision" of the need to protect the long-term integrity and traditional uses of the vast forest area, the road to that vision proved rough indeed.

When the Northern Forest Lands Study report was released in 1991, it was a virtual encyclopedia of land-conservation and regional-development strategies. Hundreds of experts, local and state leaders, and concerned citizens had participated in hearings, workshops, and conferences to contribute ideas to the Study managers. The result was a dizzying array of schemes intended to find some common ground between calls for outright public acquisition and industry's fear of regulation. Various tax reforms linked to landowner agreements on land use, creative use of conservation easements and limited acquisition of development rights, and an array of economic incentives within some sort of "green line" were explored. It was a hopeful report lauded by most key groups in the region for its far-sighted vision and sensitivity to the diverse and intertwined public/private interests involved.

But like the story of the Emperor's New Clothes, only a few pointed to a fatal flaw in the final reports of the Northern Forest Lands Study (NFLS) and the Governors' Task Force (GTF).

THE SEEDS OF GRIDLOCK

Though there had always been a tacit understanding that the NFLS would only assess the situation and explore a wide range of options appropriate to solving the perceived problems, we had always hoped that a few clear options would emerge. Further, most who served on the GTF understood that once the NFLS was completed, our role would be to recommend specific policies to our respective states and eventually to Congress. Some of us even believed that this could possibly lead to a creative new model for land management and protection within working landscapes applicable nationwide--a new public-private cooperative approach. How wrong we were.

Our naivete was first apparent at meetings of the GTF following public hearings on the draft NFLS report in early 1990. Our task was to recommend revisions in the draft (based on what we had heard at hearings) to be incorporated in the final NFLS report, and to prepare policy recommendations to be included in the GTF report for implementation of selected NFLS strategies. As reported in my 1990 article, we examined a list of likely recommendations, including a package of economic incentives linked to various land-use agreements between states and private owners to be applied within a designated "green line," clear policies for significant public land acquisitions, and creation of a regional council to replace the GTF as the organization to direct further studies and with oversight authority for land acquisition and allocation of federal funds.