Roots of rancor: examining Islamic militancy

Christian Century, Oct 24, 2001 by Charles A. Kimball

General Norman Swartzkopf has acknowledged several times on national TV that the U.S. helped train bin Laden and his forces. In the late 1970s they were considered "freedom fighters," since the enemy in Afghanistan was the U.S.S.R. Muslim revolutionaries next door in Iran at the same time were labeled "fanatics."

During the 1980s, the U.S. supported Iraq in the ten-year war of attrition against Iran. Many public-policy advocates, myself included, were highly vocal in opposition to the support of Saddam Hussein. His human rights record was among the worst in the world, and he used chemical weapons on both Kurds in his country and Iranians. President Bush labeled Saddam Hussein "an evil man" in his press conference on October 11, noting that he "gassed his own people." True. Where was the "official" outrage when these events were taking place?

The operative policy in these instances was simple: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The fallacy of such short-term, expedient policies is now all too clear.

I recently posed this question to some top U.S. business leaders: "How many of you are familiar with U.S. policies in Algeria in the last decade?" Not one hand was raised. Although not many Americans were paying attention, Muslims around the world know that the U.S. supported the regime in power when it halted elections in the early '90s after the first of two rounds. It was clear that Islamic parties were going to win the elections with 80 percent of the popular vote. Some in Congress were confused as well, thinking that we supported democratization and self-determination. Why would we help stop free elections? A top official from the Department of State was summoned for congressional testimony. He explained that our policy is "one person, one vote." "But," he added, "we are not for one person, one vote, one time." Should the Islamic parties win, he suggested, they would abolish democracy. So, the reasoning went, the U.S. cannot support a process whereby parties will use democracy in order to get power and then abolish democracy. So the policy actually turned out to be this: one person, no votes, any time.

Many Muslims around the world are unimpressed by presidential speeches extolling our virtues as freedom-loving, peaceful people who cherish democracy and our way of life. They see canceled elections and the subsequent arrest of Islamist leaders in Algeria. They see U.S. support for many repressive regimes they consider illegitimate. They see the pervasive influence of hedonistic Western culture on their traditional societies. Add in the frustration over the plight of the Palestinians and of civilians in Iraq and you've got a volatile mix.

Where do we go from here? A two-track approach is needed. The short-term task entails a careful, systematic, global effort to neutralize these misguided, violent extremists. The challenge involves pursuing military, political and economic policies that won't drive many more frustrated and angry people into the ranks of the al-Qaida network. Patience and a great deal of collective wisdom are needed.