Procedural abyss - ruling in the heresy case of Bishop Walter Righter is examined - Column

Christian Century, June 19, 1996 by William L. Sachs

THE DECISION by an Episcopal Church court last month to dismiss charges against Bishop Walter Righter ended more than a year's speculation about the possibility of a "heresy" trial. But the decision left wide open the question of what the church's doctrine is and how it is established.

As bishop of Newark, Righter in 1990 ordained a gay man who was openly living with another man. Seeking to clarify church doctrine on homosexuality, ten bishops charged Righter with violating church teaching and discipline. But the court accepted the defense's argument that there is no clear church teaching on the matter.

Righter's lawyer, Michael Rehill, had argued that for Episcopalians doctrine consists only of basic Christian affirmations, such as the divinity of Christ and the inspiration of scripture. He argued that it is unclear when Episcopalians make doctrine or how. Statements on sexuality by church bodies simply not the breadth of moral views among church members and caution against actions which erode the trust necessary to collective discernment of a coherent position. By ordaining a gay man, Righter committed no violation because it was not certain what was violated. Seven of the court's eight members accepted this argument. Though not wanting to endorse the ordination of homosexual persons, the judges nevertheless agreed that they could identify no clear ban on such action. The court embraced the idea that, beyond core beliefs, doctrinal statements simply reflect the mind of the church at a given moment. Doctrines can, and have, changed markedly. But the court hedged its approach by adding that its decision could not preclude subsequent actions on the ordination of gay persons by other Episcopal bodies. It noted the dissent of one court member and made reference to instances of Episcopal deliberation on both doctrine and sexuality. Yet the court dismissed charges against Righter because it found no clear basis for them in current Episcopal doctrine.

The court's decision acknowledged the awkwardness of its position and the divisiveness of the conflict. One party in the confrontation views doctrine and church life as subject to change under new social conditions, even at the expense of historic views of sexual morality. The other party views church doctrine, especially on sexuality, as fixed--and under siege in a permissive age. Such a broad divide cannot be spanned through judicial procedure; indeed, the court cast doubt on the status of various church procedures, notably statements by the House of Bishops. Lacking a clear way to decide, the court decided by way of negation: it decided what the church's doctrine and procedures do not say.

This outcome has heartened supporters of the ordination of noncelibate homosexuals and dismayed opponents. But the court's finding offers no basis for the definitive statement on sexuality that both sides seek, nor does it suggest how such a statement might emerge. The court could not determine how "core" Christian doctrines give rise to coherent positions on sexuality and ministry. Thus the Episcopal Church stands before a procedural abyss. How do Episcopalians delineate and articulate belief?

The ten bishops who brought charges against Righter have declared that they will mobilize for the church's triennial General Convention in 1997, at which they intend to propose a change in canon law that would oblige clergy to abstain from sexual relations outside of marriage. They want to set in legislative stone their belief that the church's ministry has distinctive marks fixed by customary understanding. Such action would produce a de facto prohibition of the ordination of homosexuals.

The locus of conflict would then shift from judicial to legislative procedures, a move which some on both sides welcome as a way of encouraging debate. Based on the Church of England's reliance upon Parliament, and modeled on the U.S. Congress, the General Convention includes a house of bishops and a house of elected lay and clerical deputies. The convention's legislative channels seem to be the means for defining and defending doctrine. Past conventions have had to address intense divisions over social issues, liturgical revision and the ordination of women. But the convention will not advance doctrinal consensus. The Righter court's conclusion demonstrates that procedural maneuvers cannot articulate doctrine. Despite the historic importance of ecclesiastical procedure for Episcopalians, the consensus which undergirds doctrine arises elsewhere.

A recent book about American political life, Democracy's Discontent, by political philosopher Michael J. Sandel, captures the nature of the Episcopal Church's dilemma. Sandel argues that public philosophy now relies upon procedures which promise to adjudicate disputes between those who affirm a liberal vision of rights versus those who uphold a conservative emphasis on moral certainty. But the result of this "procedural republic" is an enfeebled public life.

For Sandel, surmounting America's procedural abyss will require the recovery of the unity of purpose a republican sensibility is capable of producing. Rather than rely upon legislative and judicial procedures, it is necessary to devise strategies for inculcating a sense of citizenship. Sandel hopes to inspire a deep commitment to the common good beyond allegiance to the left or right.