Beyond the Summit: next steps in arms control

US Department of State Bulletin, Feb, 1988

Of course, our ability to detect and respond to violations serves to deter the other side from committing them in the first place. The type of verification regime I have described is what the President has in mind when he calls for effective verification. And we have it in the INF Treaty.

You have undoubtedly heard much about the INF verification regime. Simply put, we are entitled to onsite inspection to count Soviet INF missile systems and structures, to watch them being destroyed, to determine that no more are left after the elimination process is completed, and to check the former INF sites on short notice to make sure no missiles secretly return. We also will monitor the output of the production facility where SS-20 missiles were assembled in the past and could most readily be assembled in the future.

Does this mean that we are guaranteed that the Soviet cannot hide an INF missile somewhere on their territory? No. Only anytime, anywhere inspections without a possibility of refusal would provide hope of such a guarantee, and we believe that ceding the same right in the INF Treaty to Soviet inspectors on our territory is not in our own interests.

But if the Soviets were to succeed in secretly retaining some missiles, they could not test them, train troops in their operation, or maintain the basing infrastructure necessary to support them, all of which we could detect. Without these, the Soviets could not maintain a militarily significant capability. Thus the regime meets the standard of effective verification.

There is one final point I wish to make on the subject of INF ratification. From both sides of the Senate, we hear talk these days about the possibility of attaching reservations to the treaty, and one reservation often suggested is to delay final implementation of the elimination of INF missiles until the conventional imbalance is resolved. Alternatively, some suggest holding up a START agreement for this purpose.

I believe that either course of action would be most unwise. We have signed the INF treaty because it is in our security interest, as I have explained. Similarly, the START agreement we are seeking would be in our security interest. If we succeed in reaching such agreements, we should not be barred from putting them into effect.

The conventional imbalance is a serious matter, but it is not a problem caused or exacerbated by an INF agreement. Indeed, one of the forgotten facts about INF is that, prior to 1977, when there was no percieved need by NATO for INF missiles, NATO faced a conventional imbalance and a large force of Soviet INF missiles--SS-4s and SS-5s--for which NATO had no corresponding systems. After the INF agreement, we will return to the pre-1977 situation, except that even the SS-4s and SS-5s will be gone.

The way to address the conventional force problem is through unilateral NATO programs and at the negotiating table, and we are working on both. We and our allies are currently seeking to establish a mandate for conventional stability talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and we are discussing with our allies improvements in conventional capabilities.