The OAS and the Panama crisis - Organization of American States, Lawrence S. Eagleburger statement - transcript

US Department of State Bulletin, Nov, 1989

* The Senate hearing record includes copies of tens of thousands of dollars of charges at the Helmsley Palace Hotel in New York run up by Gen. Noriega and his family.

We have previously had the testimony before our Congress of a then-official of the Bank of Credit and Commerce, International that in 1982, Noriega opened an account at the Panama City branch of the Bank of Credit and Commerce, International which he claimed was a "secret service" account which remained open until early 1988. Only he had signature authority for the account. In addition, his wife and three daughters had credit cards, the charges for which were paid from this account. While the amount of money in this transactional account fluctuated, as much as $20-25 million were in the account at various times.

Due to legal constraints, we are still not at liberty to divulge all of the information available to us concerning Gen. Noriega's huge secret accounts. However, I have asked the Secretariat to distribute copies of genuine documents signed by Gen. Noriega with the Bank of Credit and Commerce, International. These genuine bank documents speak for themselves. They reveal personal control over millions of dollars. Like the tip of an iceberg, they allow us to visualize the depths of Noriega's deceit and criminality.

Gen. Noriega's illicit activities and the wealth he has gained from them are the real explanation of why he insists on retaining control of the institutions of the Panamanian state in defiance of the will of his own people. He is no patriot determined to defend his country from external threats. Nor is he even a professional soldier seeking to preserve his military institution.

Beginning of the Crisis in Panama

Let us remember how the crisis in Panama began. It did not have anything to do with the United States, the canal, or any outside threat to Panama or its military. Rather the crisis is the result of the reaction in June 1987 of a broad spectrum of the Panamanian people to specific accusations of assassination, election fraud, and corruption leveled against Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega by the then second in command of the PDF, Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera.

Why did Col. Diaz Herrera go public? Perhaps the answer lies in what Gen. Noriega was doing to his own institution.

When Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera died tragically in 1981, the senior officers of the Panama National Guard drew up an agreement to provide for institutional stability and transfer of command. We have asked the Secretariat to circulate copies of this signed agreement, which was disclosed by one of its signers.

Certain of its key provision involved Gen. Noriega, who solemnly signed this compact. It was provided that he would assume command from Gen. Paredes in March of 1984 and would place the support of the military behind Gen. Paredes' candidacy for the presidency. And it provided that Noriega would retire July 31, 1987.

We know what happened. Once Paredes was out, Noriega worked against his candidacy. And when Noriega's time came to retire, he fired his agreed upon successor instead. This destabilization of the institution was the proximate cause of Diaz Herrera's revelations and the subsequent revulsion of the Panamanian people--a revulsion that led to strikes and demonstrations beginning in the summer of 1987, well before the U.S. indictments, the U.S. sanctions, or the U.S. military maneuvers were even conceived.