Efforts toward peace and reconciliation in Angola - Warren Clark Jr. address - transcript

US Department of State Bulletin, Dec, 1989

Efforts Toward Peace and Reconciliation in Angola It is a real pleasure and a distinct honor for me to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa today to describe recent efforts to obtain a lasting peace and national reconciliation in Angola.

Overview

The Angolan internal peace process is taking place against the backdrop of significant changes in the region, particularly the reduction and eventual elimination of foreign troops from Angola.

In the New York accords of December 22, 1988, the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of Cuba, and the People's Republic of Angola agreed to a framework for the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and Namibia's transition to independence. South African troops had already withdrawn from Angola by the end of August 1988 in accordance with the Geneva protocol of August 5. The external settlement, brokered by former Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs] Chester A. Crocker following many months of intensive efforts, was a triumph for American diplomacy.

Two weeks ago, I traveled to Havana for the fifth regular meeting of the joint commission, whose members--South Africa, Cuba, and the People's Republic of Angola, plus the United States and the Soviet Union as observers--oversee implementation of the accords. At this meeting, the South Africans, Cubans, and Angolans reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process.

U.S. Relations With Angola

Before reviewing recent developments, let me say a word about U.S. policy toward Angola.

First we have made it clear, during the tripartite Angola/Namibia negotiations and subsequently, that the United States will continue appropriate and effective assistance to UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] until national reconciliation is achieved. Second, until national reconciliation is achieved, the United States will not recognize any government in Angola.

Let me also state that our support for UNITA is designed to impress upon the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] that there is no alternative but to negotiate peace and national reconciliation. There can be no solution on the battlefield. We strongly believe that we are on the road to achieving our goal and that our support has been a key ingredient in getting the internal peace process underway. I should underline that Soviet military assistance to the MPLA continues at massive levels.

I would also like to add a few words about our relationship with the MPLA. We are committed to dialogue and discussion with Luanda. We have had numerous contacts, both before and after the signing of the New York accords. Our door is always open to meet with MPLA representatives. However, until national reconciliation is achieved, it will be premature to talk about U.S. recognition of any government in Angola.

Steps Leading to Ghadolite

On March 13 of this year, Dr. Savimbi [Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA] made a series of offers on national reconciliation which reiterated and broadened UNITA's position favoring discussions with the MPLA. He announced a 4-month unilateral moratorium on major offensive actions and the release of MPLA military prisoners and offered to reopen the Benguela railway for nonmilitary traffic. In addition the UNITA communique of March 13 stated that its President would not participate in actual negotiations with the MPLA and would also not participate in a transitional government that would guide the country after reconciliation was achieved, preparatory to free elections.

The MPLA, for its part, responded to the UNITA offer with its own peace platform, based initially on its existing program of "amnesty" for individual UNITA members. This concept of "amnesty" had been adamantly rejected by UNITA, which saw it as an attempt to split and defeat the movement. However, by the time the chiefs of state of eight African nations gathered in Luanda on May 16, the MPLA peace plan used the term "national reconciliation" for the first time, and it appeared that a direct dialogue between the warring parties might be possible. The so-called Luanda peace plan, however, contained a number of elements which were--and remain--anathema to UNITA. It called for the "exile" of Dr. Savimbi, the "integration" of UNITA into the MPLA, and "respect for the Constitution" of the People's Republic of Angola.

UNITA objected to these terms because, despite Dr. Savimbi's offer of March 13 not to participate in an interim government, UNITA would continue to require his leadership during the negotiation and transition. Second, UNITA viewed--quite rightly--the formulation of "integration" as a means of submerging its members into the MPLA, a concept that is inconsistent with the goal of national reconciliation. Finally, it viewed "respect for the Constitution" as tantamount to acceptance of the existing one-party, Marxist-Leninist state.

The Gbadolite Summit

Despite these gaps in the MPLA and UNITA positions, intense diplomatic efforts to establish a basis for dialogue continued. These culminated in the June 22 summit of 18 African heads of state and leaders at Gbadolite, Zaire, hosted by President Mobutu. Most significantly, Dr. Savimbi was invited and attended the meeting. There, for the first time, he and [Angolan President] Dos Santos met publicly and participated in the now famous handshake signifying their mutual desire to end the civil war and begin the critical talks of national reconciliation.