Strategic defense initiative - transcript

US Department of State Bulletin, June, 1985 by Robert C. McFarlane

No issue is of greater importance to mankind today than strategic stability. A world awaits, with asperity, the reconvening of nuclear arms control negotiations on March 12. The Soviet Union has returned to the bargaining table, and we welcome them back. Ahead of us stretches a difficult path. The United States seeks equitable and verifiable agreements which significantly reduce the size of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. We hope the Soviet Union will join us in a constructive search for necessary solutions to our differences.

A Historical Perspective

These differences are profound. To see this best, it is useful to take a historical perspective. We live in a world of change. As in social and scientific areas, the strategic picture too has changed greatly since the early 1970s when the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty was signed. Certain hopes and assumptions underlying that treaty, and the accompanying SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] Interim Agreement, have been altered substantially.

One of these underlying assumptions was that the two agreements would lead to real reductions in offensive nuclear systems. That didn't happen. In negotiations, the Soviet Union has consistently refused to accept meaningful and veriable reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. SALT II did no more than set caps on already high levels of strategic arms. It is clear now that the Soviet Union never intended to settle for the rough equivalence of offensive strategic forces foreshadowed in the SALT I agreements.

Since SALT I was signed, the Soviet Union has deployed eight new strategic ballistic missles, five new ballistic missile submarine classes, and a new strategic bomber. In comparison, the United States has fielded only one new missile system, one submarine class, and has delayed deployment of the B-1 bomber. This buildup by the Soviet Union has altered the balance between opposing forces so necessary to maintaining stable deterrence. We are very concerned about the qualities of new Soviet ballistic missile systems. In time of crisis, these weapons are the most destabilizing; they are swift, carry a big payload, are mobile, and are accurate. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Soviet Union is acquiring a a survivable, first-strike capability which will be far less easy to deter.

The second assumption was that there would be mutual restraints on strategic defense. This was based on the hope that the Soviets would come to accept, in doctrine and in practice, that this mutual vulnerability to each other's offensive nuclear forces was in our common interest. This innocent expectation did not materialize either. While the United States stopped deployment of strategic defenses, the Soviet Union continued to develop and deploy successive generations of antiballistic missiles, tracking radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. In fact, spending on strategic defense has been equal to or greater than that on strategic offense. They have deployed around Moscow the world's only ballistic missile defensive system. Soviet research and development of more advanced technologies, including sophisticated directed every weapons, proceeded throughout the 1970s into the mid-1980s at a pace far in excess of our own efforts. Furthermore, along with already deployed phased-array radars, construction continues on one in central Siberia apparently capable of battle management, in clear violation of the ABM Treaty. They have constructed numerous hardened leadership bunkers and continue expansion of their extensive network of civil defense. Altogether, these efforts increase the possibility of sudden Soviet abandonment of the ABM Treaty and rapid nationwide expansion of their antiballistic defenses.

We could say that a third assumption, not surprisingly, was an expectation in the West that these and other arms control agreements would be fully observed. Here, too, we have been disappointed. The Soviet record on compliance overall is, at best, disappointing. And it is particularly disturbing in the strategic area, where they have committed serious violations of both offensive and defensive agreements. Although we have pursued resolution of these violations with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, we have received little satisfaction to date.

There is one more change I would like to mention. The assumptions made by the American negotiators in 1972 also had a technological premise. It was not feasible then to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles. But technology does not stand still. Just as we have observed the qualitative advance in strategic offensive arms, new breakthroughs in the past few years offer the promise that a militarily sound and cost-effective defense may be possible.

The Pattern Since 1972

The pattern since 1972 is clear and disturbing. Soviet actions have disproved our assumptions and thwarted real arms reductions. The balances between offensive forces, which have for years maintained deterrence between the nuclear powers, are being upset by the Soviet Union. Restraint on our part since SALT I in the deployment of offensive strategic weapons has gone unmatched by the Soviets. Instead, they have continued to increase the size, mobility, and accuracy of their offensive nuclear arsenals.