Antisatellite aims control - transcript

US Department of State Bulletin, Nov, 1985

Antisatellite Arms Control It is a pleasure to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss antisatellite (ASAT) arms control. I believe that the most significant recent event in this area was the President's certification, as required by the Department of Defense 1985 authorization act. Thus I would like, in my testimony, to focus today both on the progress of the negotiations in Geneva and that certification and its implications for arms control. First, however, I would like to review Administration thinking on space arms control.

Background

For 25 years, the United States has stationed satellites in space for peaceful purposes, including support of national security and arms control. Launch detection satellites provide immediate warning of a ballistic missile attack. Communication and navigational satellites support the command and control of U.S. and allied military forces. Other satellites provide U.S. national technical means (NTM) to assist in verification of compliance with existing arms control agreements.

The United States has been a contributor and party to several major international agreements that govern space activities, including the UN Charter, Outer Space Treaty, Limited Test Ban Treaty, and Antiballistic Missile Treaty. At U.S. initiative, bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on ASAT arms control were held during 1978-79. The United States supported the recent formation of an ad hoc committee to discuss space arms control in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

U.S. Policy

U.S. national space policy was articulated by President Reagan on July 4, 1982, and reaffirmed in his March 31, 1984, report to Congress on U.S. policy and ASAT arms control: "The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapon systems, should those measures be comatible with United States national security."

Guided by these criteria, the United States has studied a range of possible options for space arms control. Factors which complicate ASAT arms control include signficant difficulties of verification, diverse sources of threats to U.S. and allied satellites, and threats to U.S. and allied terrestrial forces posed by Soviet targeting and reconnaissance satellites.

Depending on the scope and effectiveness of an agreement, a verifiable space arms control agreement, if complied with, might limit specialized threats to satellites and constrain future threats to such key satellites as those for early warning. Limitations on specialized threats to satellites, together with satellite survivablity measures, could help preserve and enhance stability. Agreements could also raise the political threshold for attacks on space objects and meet some international concerns about unconstrained military activity in space.

On November 22, 1984, the United States and U.S.S.R. agreed to enter new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the full range of issues concerning nuclear and space arms. The January 7-8 meeting between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Shultz began this process by reaching an understanding as to the subject and objectives of the negotiations.

It was agreed that the objective of the negotiations is to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations are being conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three grops, one of which is addressing defense and space issues.

Arms Control Issues

The 1978-79 ASAT arms control talks revealed major U.S.-Soviet differences, and subsequent study has brought space arms control issues into sharper focus. Space arms control involves difficulties.

Verification. Verification problems are aggravated for space systems because satellites that serve U.S. and allied security are few in number; cheating, even on a small scale, could pose a disproportionate risk. For example, a ban on all ASAT systems would require elimination of the current Soviet ASAT interceptor system, but no satisfactory means has been found to effectively verify Soviet compliance with such an undertaking. The Soviet interceptor is relatively small and launched by a booster and launch pad used for other space missions. We do not know how many interceptors have been manufactured, and the U.S.S.R. could maintain a covert supply.

Breakout. Amoung the criteria which must be used in evaluating the implications for national security of any potential arms control easure is that of "breakout." This is the risk that a nation could gain unilateral advantage if the agreement ceased to remain in force for any reason--for example, through sudden abrogation--and obtain a head start in building or deploying a type of weapon which had been banned or severely limited. The importance of certain critical U.S. satellites, which are limited in numbers, could create an incentive for the Soviets to maintain a breakout capability.