Antisatellite aims control - transcript

US Department of State Bulletin, Nov, 1985

Necessity of MV Testing. The primary purposes of a U.S. ASAT capability are to deter threats to space systems of the United States and its allies and, within such limits imposed by international law, to deny any adversary advantages arising from the offensive use of space-based systems which could undermine deterrence.

The U.S.S.R. has the world's only operational ASAT system with an effective capability to seek and destroy critical U.S. space systems in near-Earth orbit. In addition, since space systems are vulnerable to a broad range of threats from direct attack to electronic warfare to nuclear effects, the Soviet Union could have developed--without our knowledge--a variety of other means to attack our satellites.

There is also a growing threat posed by present and prospective Soviet satellites which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to support directly the U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces in the event of conflict. These include ocean reconnaissance satellites which use radar and electronic intelligence in efforts to provide targeting data for use in attacking U.S. and allied surface fleets. They also include photographic and electronic intelligence satellites which provide targeting data and other information useful in supporting Soviet land forces. These Soviet space assets constitute a clear threat to our national security and that of our allies.

The United States must take the steps necessary to avert a situation in which the Soviet Union has full freedom to conduct effective attacks on our space systems knowing that their space objects, including those that provide targeting data, are not vulnerable to U.S. attack. The resultant instability from this asymmetry creates a risk of irrevocable harm to the United States. U.S. development of a credible ASAT system is a necessary integral part of the steps needed to avert this situation. Therefore, testing of the MV against objects in space by the United States is necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security of the United States and its allies.

Impact on the Negotiations. The ASAT testing which we intend to undertake follows by more than a decade the initiation by the U.S.S.R. of its testing of a coorbital ASAT system which has for some time been the world's only operational ASAT system. The Soviets, moreover, as noted above, have tested and, in some cases deployed, other systems which have inherent ASAT capabilities. The existence of such Soviet capabilities and their testing effectively preclude the possibility that testing by the United States of its MV ASAT will constitute an irreversible step.

In addition, we believe that testing can constitute an incentive to the Soviet Union to reach agreements on a wide range of issues and thus would not impair prospects for a successful conclusion to the negotiations now underway.

Compatibility with the ABM Treaty. The Testing against objects in space of the U.S. F-15 MV ASAT system will not give the system the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and will not constitute a test in an ABM mode. Therefore, such testing is not prohibited by the ABM Treaty.