The strategic importance of the emerging Pacific

US Department of State Bulletin, Dec, 1986

Very recently--within the past 3 or 4years--the Soviet Union has demonstrated newfound, virtually unprecedented interest in the Pacific states. They have sent their emissaries to explore commercial and diplomatic opportunities in the area. The reception has been largely skeptical, tentative, and quite limited in scope. Moscow is discovering, in its belated arrival, that its reputation has preceded it. As Pacific governments weigh the benefits of commercial cooperation against the risks of association with the polar bear from the north, they cautiously consider the price of political dependence that inevitably accompanies economic dependence on the Soviet Union.

I do not anticipate a groundswell ofgreeting to the Soviet newcomers. Frankly, the political traditions of the Pacific area are wholly incompatible with those of the Soviet Union. Moscow knows it and, most importantly, the Pacific people know it. The sad history of Soviet involvement in the Caribbean, in the Middle East, and in Africa--not to mention Eastern Europe--betrays little promise to the forward-looking people of the emerging Pacific.

For our part, we do not view therecent Soviet initiatives in the South Pacific with particular alarm or distress. We do, however, sense the importance of preventing the area's conversion into yet another arena of major power confrontation. This consideration calls into question the long-range role and goals of the Soviet Union in penetrating this area of the Pacific.

The dramatic record of Sovietmilitary buildup in the Asian-Pacific region more broadly, over the past 10 years, is well known. Both the quality and quantity of its regional armed forces have expanded perilously as Moscow seeks to impress and intimidate its Asian neighbors. The Soviet Pacific naval fleet is now its largest. Moscow has regularly supplemented its force capabilities at Cam Ranh Bay and its military aid to North Korea, while targeting one-third of its SS-20 nuclear missiles on the Asian region. As they probe incessantly for weak points in the U.S. defense alliance system, the Soviets attempt to expand their own political and military tactical maneuverability. Fortunately, Moscow's adventurism, thus far, has had negative political consequences for itself in the region.

Two months ago, Soviet PremierGorbachev delivered an address at Vladivostok devoted largely to sweeping, amorphous "confidence-building measures' that ignore the root causes of insecurity in the Asian region. Many Asian observers have pointed out that the Vladivostok address reflects more stylistic nuance in Soviet foreign policy rather than any significant new substance. Even so, it seems to represent an expression of Soviet determination to play a more activist role in the region. What we might hope to see in terms of real Soviet peace initiatives in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Korea, and the Japanese Northern Territories, however, remains largely elusive. Until these specific sources of regional conflict and instability are addressed, there is little room for hope that grand schemes of "confidence' promotion will bring any real relaxation of Asian and Pacific tensions.