U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf - George P. Shultz's statement before the Senate Foreign Relation Committee on Jan. 27, 1987

US Department of State Bulletin, March, 1987

U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf

Secretary Shultz's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 27, 1987.1

I appreciate this opportunity to testifyon American interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of some recent developments there. Chief among these is the Iran-Iraq war, whose continuation threatens the stability of neighboring states and the pursuit of our interests in the region. The outcome of this war will affect the strategic shape of the Persian Gulf and Middle East for years to come. It is, therefore, important to focus on U.S. policy toward the war and the region at large.

Stability in the Persian Gulf mattersto us for three reasons.

First, it is critical to the economichealth of the West. An interruption in the flow of oil or control of these energy resources by an unfriendly power could have devastating effects on the pattern of world trade and on our economy.

Second, our interests would suffergreatly if Iranian expansionism were to subvert friendly states or otherwise boost anti-American forces within the region.

Third, as part of the strategiccrossroads of the Middle East, this area must not come under the domination of a power hostile to the United States and its allies. Therefore, America's near-term priority is to reassure the gulf Arab states of our support and to stand fast on our antiterrorism and arms embargo policies.

U.S. Policy Toward the War

Since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq warin September 1980, the United States has sought the earliest possible end to the conflict--one which would secure the independence and territorial integrity of both countries, as well as security for third parties in the region who now are directly threatened by the conflict. We have pursued these goals through the following policies.

We have been denying MunitionsList equipment to both Iran and Iraq. There was a limited exception to this policy, as you know. There will be no further exceptions--no more transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment to Iran, either directly or through any third party.

We are supporting all reasonablediplomatic efforts to encourage Iran to abandon its unwillingness to negotiate an end to the war. These efforts have included U.S. encouragement of the UN Secretary General, the Nonaligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference--which is holding its summit in Kuwait this week. The problem has been lack of Iranian interest in any peace proposal--except on Iranian terms.

Therefore, we are also energeticallypursuing efforts to inhibit the resupply to Iran from third countries of significant weapons systems and spare parts which might enable Iran to carry the war further into Iraqi territory. This is our Operation Staunch, which we will continue to pursue in an energetic and determined manner.

Because of our concern over thepossible spread of the Iran-Iraq conflict to third countries in the gulf, we have publicly and privately reiterated our firm commitments to the security of nonbelligerent gulf states. We have repeatedly warned Iran that any extension of the conflict would be regarded as a major threat to U.S. interests.

Our relations with these countries--including the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman)--are important to our long-term security interests. The war directly threatens their security as well as their economic survival. We have publicly stated our fundamental interest in helping the gulf states defend themselves against attack or subversion.

The war has also highlightedoverlapping interests with Iraq, as it defends itself against Iranian attack. The news of our limited arms shipments to Iran was a shock to Baghdad, and it has put some strain in our relationship. Nevertheless, I think both sides understand that we share an overriding common interest in finding an early end to the war. For our part, the United States will continue to pursue this objective; and we will do all we can to reaffirm the strength of our policies toward the gulf.

Long-Term American Interests

Our current policies, of course, reflectlongstanding interests in this region. Hence I want to review our goals and objectives in the region as a whole.

American interests in the PersianGulf have long been readily defined. We have an overriding strategic interest in denying the Soviet Union either direct control or increased influence over the region or any of its states. We have major political interests in the nonbelligerent gulf states, both in their own right and because of their influence within the gulf and beyond. And we have a vital economic stake in seeing that the region's supply of oil to the West continues unimpeded.

Our multiple interests in the gulfgive us common ground with its various states. As I have mentioned, they share our overriding concern with economic and political stability. Their economic life depends on the flow of oil to the industrialized world. Anything that might disrupt their commerce--war, political instability, terrorism, or subversion--is against their interests as well as ours.