Interpreting the ABM Treaty - Paul H. Nitze's address before the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies on April 1, 1987 - transcript

US Department of State Bulletin, June, 1987

Interpreting the ABM Treaty

by Paul H. Nitze

Address before the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies on April 1, 1987. Ambassador Nitze is special adviser to the President and the Secretary of State for arms control matters.

Central to the arms control portion of today's foreign policy debate is the question of how the limitations in the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty apply to strategic defense development and testing activities. This debate has focused on two alternative interpretations of treaty obligations, the so-called broad and narrow interpretations. This issue of interpretation arises because the language of the ABM Treaty is ambiguous in its treatment of certain advanced technologies being investigated by both the U.S. SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program (including laser, particle beam, and kinetic energy devices and passive sensors) and by the Soviet Union.

When the language of a treaty is ambiguous, compilations on international law say that, in interpreting the treaty, reference can be made to the treaty negotiating record and the record of subsequent practice of the parties pursuant to the treaty. The Senate proceedings leading to the treaty's ratification also bear on this matter.

An Administration analysis of the ABM Treaty negotiating record has been made available to the Senate. On the basis of that analysis, President Reagan concluded that the broad interpretation was fully justified. We continue to support that conclusion.

Six weeks ago, President Reagan directed that comprehensive analyses also be conducted of the other two bodies of evidence that may bear on the proper interpretation of the treaty-the record of subsequent practice of the two parties and the U.S. treaty ratification proceedings. These studies should be completed by April 30. The Administration will consult fully with the Congress on the results of the studies and the implications of all three analyses for the future conduct of the SDI program.

As the debate on ABM Treaty interpretation continues, it is important to make clear the parameters of the issue. I will try to do so and to clarify as well why my recollection of the ABM Treaty negotiations, reinforced by my review of the negotiating record, leads me to believe that the limits posited by the broad interpretation are all that the Soviet negotiators agreed to in a manner binding on themselves.

Nature of the Dispute

Most of the ABM Treaty, as it bears upon the SDI program, is not in dispute. The issue between the broad and the narrow interpretation relates to the fact that, at the time the treaty was negotiated, all ABM systems then deployed or contemplated for deployment were based upon a combination of ABM interceptor missiles, launchers for those missiles, and ABM radars. The broad versus narrow issue concerns only the development and testing of systems based upon physical principles other than those involved in such ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, and of the components of such systems.

The current debate poses no issue with respect to the deployment either of components or of systems based upon other physical principles; allare agreed that deployment of such components or systems is not permitted without prior consultation and amendment to the treaty. Thus, the basic principle of the treaty-that, without amendment to the treaty, neither side may deploy systems or components except as provided in article III not in question. There is also no issue with respect to research; the word "research" is nowhere used in the treaty.

With respect to testing, the issue does not apply to the testing of components of fixed, ground-based ABM systems at an agreed test site or deployment area, regardless of whether an interception occurs in space or in the atmosphere. Article IV permits such testing. The issue also does not apply to testing of systems based on other physical principles that are fixed and land based. The issue concerns only tests of mobile (including space-based) systems based upon other physical principles and their components able to substitute for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars.

Under the narrow interpretation, such tests would not be permitted because that interpretation would require the substitute component to be fixed, land based, and at an agreed test range or deployment area. Under the broader interpretation, they would generally be permitted, even if mobile (including space based).

Provisions of the Treaty

To aid in understanding the interpretation issue, it is useful to have in mind the pertinent provisions of the treaty. The following is a condensation of those provisions; the full text is, of course, available to those who prefer to consult it.

Article I of the treaty prohibits deployment of ABM systems for a territorial defense and providing a base for such a defense. It also prohibits deployment of ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided in article III. Article I thus limits deployment, not testing, and limits ABM systems, not ABM components.