Perestroika and the future of socialism - part 1 - social and political in the Soviet Union

Monthly Review, March, 1990

PERESTROIKA AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM--PART ONE

Readers have for some time now been asking us to write about developments in the Soviet Union. We have been hesitating to do so because of the lack of information needed for a proper analysis, especially if the reforms proposed and underway are to be examined in relation to the conflicting interests of different classes (or social strata), nationalities, and regions of that vast land. The upsurge of strikes and nationalist movements are clear signs of divisions among the people. But these have not yet congealed into clear-cut differences among class or other social group over the various aspects of the policies advanced under the rubric of perestroika.

On the other hand, divisions are clearly evident within the Soviet ruling elite itself over the kinds of reforms needed and/or the speed of their implementation. Despite vigorous opposition, the reforming faction of the ruling elite has thus far succeeded in achieving remarkable advances toward democracy and open debate. The debates we learn about, however, come from the articulate sectors of society--in other words, from the upper layers.

These free-wheeling debates made public considerable information about the nature of the social and economic crises in which the Soviet Union has become mired. But frankness has not yet extended to the politics of class and ideology. In fact, much of the discussion of economic policy resembles that of bourgeois economists insofar as the diagnoses and proposed remedies are presumed to be value-free. True, the language of socialism prevails, usually as a commitment to "social justice." What this implies appears to be advocacy of special measures for the poorest and least privileged sectors of the population, and recognition that price reforms and the removal of subsidies will cause unusual hardship for the masses. But the central thrust of the reforms is clearly the attainment of a rapid and continuous rise in the gross national product, assuming as do bourgeois ideologists that in the well-worn phrase a rising tide lifts all ships.

Therefore, even though the need to improve pensions, health and educational services, and the like is fully acknowledged, the perestroika debates are essentially technocratic in nature. The subjects dealt with--the optimal mix of plan and market, when and how to decontrol prices, ways to balance the budget, the banking system best suited to finance self-managed enterprises, etc.--are focused, first, on how to shake the economy out of stagnation, and, second, on how to raise the long-run growth rate.

In all of this, critical examination of such fundamental matters as the meaning and purpose of socialism seems to be off the agenda of the policy makers and their advisers. It is with this in mind that we propose to examine the changes taking place, with the emphasis on those aspects which we believe socialists in this country should be thinking about. But as a preliminary, we need to review the background of the restructuring planned and under way in the Soviet Union today.

Although Mikhail Gorbachev has put his personal stamp on glasnost and perestroika, the significance of these projects goes far beyond the man. Of course, individuals at the helm of power can and do make a difference. But it is well to recognize that Gorbachev himself is a product of the Soviet system and that the changes he is presiding over are rooted in social changes and movements that have been germinating for a long time.

The significance of these developments has for the most part been ignored by Western Sovietologists. Their vision has been limited to surface phenomena, resulting in their seeing only an immobile and inflexible society incapable of mounting major reforms. In contrast, a handful of Marxist students of the Soviet Union, having the advantage of looking at the present as history, have been able to see a society in flux. Thus, Isaac Deutscher, shortly after Stalin's death, pointed to the likelihood of a new historical departure in the Soviet Union due to the "profound contradiction...maturing between, to use the Marxian term, the social and economic structure and the political superstructure of post-Stalinist society." (Isaac Deutscher, Russia: What Next? New York: Oxford, 1953, p. 89)

The end of the Stalinist reign of terror did indeed bring closer to the surface pressures of competing interest groups in the Soviet Union as well as the play of factions in the ruling elite. By means of compromise and repression, however, the political superstructure was kept intact for a good many years to come. But even though the dominant faction was able to keep the lid on, the pot continued to boil with vigor. In a prescient and illuminating essay written toward the end of the Brezhnev era, Daniel Singer explained what was in the cards:

The party hierarchy, clinging not just to state property but to all means of control over the population, has presided over a tremendous transformation of Soviet society, its structure changing almost beyond recognition. True, Stalinist mass terror prevented these changes from crystallizing politically, and the more selective repression introduced by his successors still does not allow the open expression of class interests. But below the surface this new social make-up is beginning to exercise pressure on the power structure, especially at the top. A conflict is opening up within the party hierarchy between its bureaucratic and its technocratic wings; still hidden and partly controlled, it may soon alter the nature of the ruling establishment. (Daniel Singer, The Road to Gdansk. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981, Chapter Two, "The Soviet Union: Seeds of Change," p. 117)