Perestroika and the future of socialism - part 2

From the very outset the Commune was compelled to recognize that the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exception, subject to recall at any moment. What had been the characteristic attribute of the former state? . . . .

Against [the] transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society--an inevitable transformation in all previous states--the Commune made use of two infallible means. In the first place it filled all posts--administrative, judicial, and educational--by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors. And, in the second place, all officials high or low, were paid only the wages received by other workers. . . . In this way an effective barrier to place-hunting and careerism was set up, even apart from the binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies which were added besides.

It should go without saying that the Soviet Union is very far from meeting the standards set by Marx and Engels in this and other writings. Yet in glasnost and related political reforms, it seems thus far to be at least facing in that direction.

Encouraging, important, and necessary as these moves toward democracy are, they still do not directly address the stubborn problems of the economic crisis in which the Soviet Union finds itself mired. Why?

As discussed earlier, structural problems in the supply of labor and materials brought about a long-run decline in the rate of growth of the economy, and the traditional panacea of Soviet planners--increasing the stock of capital goods--had lost its effectiveness and even become counterproductive. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, the bureaucratic structure of the party and the state served as a protective shield against change. The administrative apparatus had plenty of ways to sabotage innovative reforms. Officials had little reason to be concerned about whistle blowers and other critics as long as the means of repressing trouble makers were at hand. Incompetence and corruption were covered up in an intertwined and interdependent network in which patronage played an ever present role. There was no way the counterweight to bureaucratic inertia inherent in the creative potential of the masses could express itself. The political turning to democracy was thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the reawakening of the economy.

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that Soviet economists, including Gorbachev's closest advisers, should conclude that the country's economic problems were attributable to the planning system and that the way out would be to substitute a system of economic regulation through markets as practiced under capitalism. This would involve freeing the various units that make up the economy from bureaucratic restraints and directives and allowing them to operate in the manner of competing enterprises in the market economies of the West. The result would presumably be elimination of shortages and waste and a greatly increased efficiency in the utilization of labor and materials.