Perestroika and the future of socialism - part 2

Pressure for marketization is not the only indication that the Soviet reform movement has a capitalist orientation. Others are the strong preference for integration of the Soviet economy into the global capitalist network of trade and finance, and the great admiration for the high-tech culture of the advanced countries of the West, both of which permeate the Soviet reform literature. In evaluating these tendencies, it is important to preserve a sense of balance and to avoid falling into a sterile dogma of either condemnation or uncritical enthusiasm.

No sensible person believes that a socialist country should eschew economic relations with the capitalist world, but it is a time-honored tenet of socialist thought (and indeed of heterodox bourgeois thought as well) that a country with a weak economy that wants to maintain its independence and the possibility of charting its own course needs to protect itself against being overwhelmed and economically subjugated by stronger countries. The form this protection takes can vary according to circumstances, but what is essential is that the weaker country should have control over what it buys and sells abroad and the terms on which foreigners do business within its borders.

History records many cases of weak countries that have successfully defended their independence and have grown strong in the process (the United States and Japan are perhaps the two most outstanding examples). On the other hand, there are even more cases of weak countries shunning protective measures in the belief that laissez-faire in matters of trade and investment would be in their best interest. Most of these have ended up as dependents of their stronger partners, with their economies being shaped for the benefit of others rather than their own citizens. In the present international context there is no doubt that the Soviet Union is a weak economy vis-a-vis the advanced capitalist countries it wants to integrate with, and the perestroika literature certainly suggests a willingness to do so on terms very favorable to the capitalist side. If things actually develop along these lines (so far there is not much concrete experience to go by), it is hard to see how the Soviets can avoid increasingly adapting and adjusting their institutions and policies to the needs and preferences of their stronger partners.

With regard to the Soviet Union's relation to the high-tech culture of the West, no sensible person believes that in developing their economy the Soviets should avoid taking part in and deriving maximum benefit from today's ongoing scientific-technological revolution(s). But there are different ways of going about it. One is to be guided at all times by the needs and priorities of a huge country suffering from all the grave problems and deprivations that we discussed at considerable length in Part One of this essay in last month's MR

-- the need to supply running water to hospitals, toilets for schools, sewers for villages, silos to save grain from going to waste, country-to-town roads, and much, much more.