Low-revenue contenders need help to stay at top

Sporting News, The, Oct 16, 2000 by Ken Rosenthal

The smart guys won.

That was the moral of the story when three teams in the lower half of the payroll standings reached the playoffs.

The smart guys won, and maybe the game isn't in as much trouble as Commissioner Bud Selig and Co. would have you believe.

"This is still a game of intellect," agent Scott Boras says. "Money will only help those with intellect, who are on top of their game."

The Yankees, Braves and Mets qualify in that regard. The Orioles, Dodgers and several other big-spending clubs do not.

The question is what to make of the three low-budget playoff qualifiers--the Giants, White Sox and A's.

As usual in baseball, the answer depends on your agenda.

Selig says that officials from the White Sox and A's labeled their success an "aberration," and he too embraced that term. The argument: Under the current economic system, such clubs will be unable to keep their players and sustain success.

Three in one postseason is "not something I would bank on next year," says Paul Beeston, chief operating officer for Major League Baseball. "That has been time-tested."

Perhaps, if you consider the time frame used by the blue-ribbon panel assigned to study the game's finances--the post-strike period from 1995 to '99.

That, union chief Donald Fehr says, "doesn't make sense at all."

Fehr says the strike hit the small-market teams the hardest, and their attendance is only now returning to pre-strike levels. He said that the world champion Yankees of 1996, '98 and '99 were the aberration, and that the dominant team before them--Atlanta--began its run as a low-revenue club. To Fehr, the glass is half full.

"We ought to be applauding what is happening," Fehr says. "I'm going to leave it to other people to be pessimistic and miserable. That's not me."

For years, MLB has argued that the game is on a respirator, but it keeps predicting different causes of death for an autopsy that never comes.

In the early '90s, the argument was that teams couldn't afford players' salaries. Now the argument is that some teams can pay, but others can't

Is the game really broken?

Not if you look at the new television contract

Not if you consider rising attendance figures.

Not if you remember that the revenue-sharing plan phased in under the last basic agreement only reached 100 percent effectiveness this season.

No question, payroll disparity is a major issue when the Yankees check in at $112 million and the Twins are stuck at $14.6 million.

But some low-revenue teams need to move. Others need to build new ballparks. And still others view revenue sharing as a means to improve their owners' bottom line, not increase payroll.

Let's face it--the game is cyclical, even for the Yankees, who suddenly are showing their age. And the current economic system, while the polar opposite of the NFL's, creates a similar (if unintentional) effect, giving teams brief windows of opportunity.

Obviously, the Yankees and Braves have the resources to extend their windows, while the A's do not. But player development is the backbone of every successful franchise. And though no one talks about it, there are forces working against the big spenders, too.

"The problem with the big-market clubs in New York, Los Angeles and other places is that you don't have time to rebuild. You're expected to win every year," Dodgers general manager Kevin Malone says.

"It's hard for teams like us to balance the two. You do have a long-term plan. But you've got to take more risks. The more risks you take, the more mistakes you're going to make."

Why have the Yankees and Braves been so successful? Because they've struck the proper balance and made the fewest mistakes.

Why were the White Sox able to win the A.L. Central with a payroll of $36.98 million and the A's the A.L. West with a payroll of $32.17 million?

Because they did a superior job evaluating talent through trades and the draft.

"They can hold those players for a while," Mariners G.M. Pat Gillick says. "But as those players continue to have success, they have to be paid. (The White Sox and A's) are going to have to increase their payrolls, unless they decide to let those players go."

That's not entirely true--the A's have followed the Indians' model, signing many of their young players to long-term contracts. But if the draft is the best way for low-revenue clubs to achieve parity, why not create more opportunities for them to acquire top amateur talent?

Boras is full of ideas on that front, and not surprisingly, some would work to his benefit. Still, his concepts are more creative than anything you hear out of the commissioner's office.

First, Boras would force teams with the highest payrolls--say, the top 10 or 15--to pay for their first-round picks. If they wanted to select, they would contribute a pre-determined sum to the revenue-sharing pool. Or, they could pass and keep their money.

Next, Boras would allow trading draft picks--would the Yankees have taken Derek Jeter at No. 6 in 1992 or dealt the choice? Boras also would create separate drafts for high school and college players, giving clubs with the worst records two chances to add top-tier prospects.