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Sporting News, The, Feb 2, 2004 by Paul Attner

It was the perfect call at the proper time. Tennessee had just recovered a fumble at midfield late in the third quarter of its playoff game against the Patriots. With the score tied at 14, the Titans decided to attempt a quick strike off a trick pass from tight end Frank Wycheck to receiver Drew Bennett. With New England's attacking defense in its most aggressive mode, the play should have been a winner. But it wasn't. And its collapse illustrates in a few stunning seconds the wrenching task facing quarterback Jake Delhomme and the Panthers in Super Bowl 38.

The Titans lined up with two receivers split to each side and Wycheck in the slot to the right. Linebacker Willie McGinest had his hand on the ground inside Wycheck; he would be a pass rusher on the play. That's what Tennessee was anticipating. With McGinest charging the pocket, quarterback Steve McNair would step back and toss a backward pass to Wycheck, who then would throw to Bennett on a streak pattern downfield. But immediately after the snap, McGinest, a 10-year veteran, veered from his path and spun toward Wycheck as if he knew the all. Wycheck caught the ball, but McGinest already was in his face, dumping him for a 10-yard loss. Bennett was wide open and easily could have scored. But Wycheck never had a chance.

Against a less-experienced, less-schooled defense, the play likely would have resulted in a touchdown. But not against the Patriots, whose starting defense totals 91 years of NFL experience and whose coaching staff prepares its players so well that they seem to know every nuance of opposing offenses.

In a detailed film study of the Patriots during three recent games, a pattern emerges that helps pull back the layers of the mystique that surrounds Bill Belichick and his players, revealing the intricacies and strengths that combine to make this the most discussed and revered defensive unit in the NFL. It is the mystique surrounding the Pats, as much as their actual playing skills, that Delhomme will be up against. He's fighting history--the way Belichick confused the mighty Rams offense in Super Bowl 36; the way he has neutralized two of the NFL's most prolific offenses in this season's playoffs. And Delhomme will be fighting the aura of Belichick's brilliant game-planning, especially considering he will have had two weeks to scheme.

Yet this is not the Steel Curtain. The Patriots definitely affect the flow and consistency of an offense, causing opponents to think and hesitate far more than they want. But because there are no Hall of Fame players on this unit, there are physical matchups Carolina can win. But being able to exploit those matchups--remember, Belichick knows the weaknesses of his defense, too--with enough time and repetitiveness is another story.

Belichick and coordinator Romeo Crennel have taken what is not a particularly speedy group of athletes, mixed in a couple of rookies who play prominent roles in the secondary, lived without a premier pass rusher and successfully preached to all of them the importance of aggressiveness, intelligence and execution. That the players have bought completely into this approach is obvious in their on-field performance.

"Jake will spend a week hearing about this defense, and it's going to be tough for him to keep it in perspective" says Sporting News and FOX Sports analyst Brian Baldinger. "I think it is important that they don't overload Jake, that he doesn't think too much and freeze. Sometimes against this team, you bring in so much mentally that it hurts your performance in the game."

But it's difficult to avoid the mental strain created by the mystique. It is a given that Belichick, as he does for every game, will feature concepts and approaches that Carolina won't have seen on tape. That is the complicating factor any time you play the Patriots--and it's what makes playing them so difficult. What will he change and how long will it take you to not only recognize the switch but figure out how to exploit it?

Against the Titans, the Patriots played soft coverage in the secondary, rarely pressing receivers at the line but constantly mixing their zone packages. Strong safety Rodney Harrison spent much of the game near the line, either as an extra run stopper or a blitzer stalking McNair. In contrast, the Patriots played nothing but bump-and-run against the Colts in the AFC championship game, beating up the Indianapolis receivers. And Harrison stayed mostly deep in the secondary, shading toward Marvin Harrison, providing help for cornerback Ty Law against Peyton Manning's primary target. These are extreme changes in philosophy regarding pass defense, changes that most teams never would attempt--yet the results were stunning. Against the league's co-MVPs, they gave up a combined 28 points, allowed fewer than 600 total yards and just 408 passing yards on 73 attempts, forced five interceptions and turned McNair and Manning into indecisive, frustrated players.

Manning said later he understood how New England was taking away Harrison, who had only three catches for 19 yards. Yet other than a few passes into the flat near game's end--passes into areas abandoned by Law as he ran downfield with Harrison--the Colts did not counter this defensive approach with any effective solutions. Manning's annoyance with his inability to make positive plays became increasingly evident in his body language. He also reacted poorly to pass-rush pressure, which was generated mostly by a four- or five-man rush; the Patriots rarely blitzed.