Mavs make their move, but at what cost?

Sporting News, The, March 4, 2002 by Sean Deveney

When I was a young lad, my father taught me there were three things you should never trust: yellow lights, seafood that has been put on clearance sale and very, very rich men. Though I appreciate that Mavericks owner Mark Cuban is a self-made man, having made his billions by selling the voltage of his brainpower to behemoths such as CompuServe and Yahoo!, and though I also appreciate that he has maintained his ability to mingle with the lumpen, he still is a very, very rich man.

Pardon me, then, if I am a little suspicious of Cuban's latest endeavor. Blame it on my dad. But there's something that is just not right about the blockbuster seven-player deal Cuban orchestrated with the Nuggets at the trade deadline last week. The deal sent Juwan Howard, Tim Hardaway, Donnell Harvey and some of Cuban's pocket lint to Denver and brought Raef LaFrentz, Nick Van Exel, Avery Johnson and Tariq Abdul-Wahad to Dallas.

Maybe I am suspicious because the Mavericks are beginning to resemble another team owned by a very, very rich man, one whose payroll doubles the league's salary cap. Maybe it's because the Mavericks have taken on the look of Trail Blazers South.

Certainly, for the accountants, Dallas has that Portland-ish look. Cuban has deep pockets, but the depths of one's pockets do not necessarily lead to NBA success, as Blazers owner Paul Allen can attest. You can't simply buy up talent without regard for roles and cohesiveness. This is why very, very rich men such as Allen and Cuban have found it impossible to get their teams past that of moderately wealthy Lakers owner Jerry Buss, a mere real estate mogul who was smart enough to have team-building guru and former Lakers president Jerry West making his decisions.

The Mavericks, like the Trail Blazers before them, already have gotten themselves into a considerable salary-cap mess. Cuban handed out a couple of deranged contracts last summer when he gave center Shawn Bradley a seven-year deal worth up to $40 million and gave reserve center Evan Eschmeyer $20 million over six years. Michael Finley is in the first year of a seven-year, $102 million contract, and Dirk Nowitzki signed a six-year maximum-dollar extension just before the season that will be worth about $95 million. The Mavericks also must pay the remaining $45 million (over four years) on Van Exel's deal, plus about $70 million over six years if they intend to keep LaFrentz this summer.

Add the four years and $45 million on Van Exel's contract and the absurd five years and $34 million for Abdul-Wahad, and that's a lot of eight-digit numbers on the Dallas payroll, which should be around $75 million next season. Sure, Cuban can afford it, but there is bad precedent for skyrocketing past the salary cap the way the Mavericks have--only the Knicks and Blazers will be in Dallas' payroll neighborhood, and look where it has gotten them. Short-term indulgence usually inhibits a team's ability to improve later. An owner who overspends on players finds roster changes become more difficult should those players flop (see: Shawn Kemp, Howard Eisley, Damon Stoudamire, et. al.).

But for Dallas, the potential ledgerbook problems of this deal were not nearly so daunting as the problem the Mavericks had on the court: They were lacking size. Of course, only a handful of NBA teams are not lacking size, but for the Mavericks, the problem is made much more acute because the team intends to win the NBA championship. To do so, there is the very big problem of Lakers center Shaquille O'Neal. Though most teams have resigned to waiting for O'Neal's retirement for a shot at a championship, credit Dallas for at least taking action. Whether that action makes any sense is to be determined.

The gem of the deal for Dallas was LaFrentz, a rare commodity in that he is 6-11 and athletic, a good shot blocker and a threat from the 3-point line. He is not an inside presence, not a great rebounder and certainly not the kind of guy who can throw his body at O'Neal. But his ability to shoot 3-pointers makes him a tough guy to cover for O'Neal or any center, and his ability to block shots makes him a big improvement over Howard defensively.

Other than LaFrentz, this deal does more harm than good for Dallas. Without question, the trade gives the Mavericks a highscoring lineup--Nowitzki, Finley, Steve Nash and Van Exel each average more than 19 points, and LaFrentz averages 14.9. But this team was leading the league in scoring before the trade, at 104.9 points per game. It did not need more points.

If there was a weakness in Dallas, which allows a league-high 101.7 points a game, it was defense. It was not point guard, Van Exel's position, where Nash is an All-Star and Hardaway had been providing clutch shooting and veteran leadership. The Mavericks now must squeeze Van Exel onto the court with Finley and Nash.

That sets up the squishy, unpredictable concern of team chemistry. Before the trade, there was harmony in the Dallas locker room. Adding LaFrentz and Van Exel might disrupt that, especially as roles and scoring opportunities are diluted. Before the season, Cuban said via e-mail that he feels good chemistry is as much a product of the organization as the players in the locker room, and Cuban's enthusiasm always keeps spirits high. Still, just as the Mavericks have the potential to resemble the Blazers in terms of salary troubles, there is the potential to resemble them in attitude troubles, where too many players filling the same roles leads to widespread disgruntlement.