Letters - Letter to the Editor

Railway Age, July, 2002

Remote control vs. conventional switching

Richmond, Calif.

To the Editor:

Conventional switch engines run virtual circles around remote control, and the absence of performance data on this subject is causing over-reliance on the pitches of remote control suppliers.

Economic analysis favors remote control in highly repetitive, short switching moves such as those found in unit-train loading or gravity hump yard operation. In non-gravity switching, however, remote control economics turn negative, relative to conventional switch engines. Canadian National and Canadian Pacific remote control crews I contacted in Vancouver, B.C., provided me with nearly identical, yet independent stories. Both have experienced bad flat spots on their remote-control-equipped switch engines. The hammering from such wheels can cost more in track structure damage than an engineer's wage. Both suffered from overspeed couplings and "shoved out" equipment, which is the result of the following: Since remote control rules forbid its operation while riding the side of a freight car, the operator becomes more quickly fatigued due to the extra weight, extra walking, and other stresses imposed by remote control. This yields overspeed couplings and associated damage. Further, both experienced frequent rem ote control malfunction, not to mention wasted time for remote control crews and their "point-protection-zoned" switch leads.

Most noteworthy is the productivity ratio. According to the CN and CP crews, at least three remote control switch engines are required to equal the productivity of two conventional switch engines, assuming 100% crew utilization. They compensate the one-third remote control productivity loss by having main line crews switch out their inbound trains, and by having remote control crews "shotgun" outbound trains, thereby transferring much of their switching burden east of Vancouver.

Three remote control engines with two switchmen each require six employees. Two conventional switch engines with one engineer and two switchmen each also require six employees. With remote control, six people are walking yard tracks instead of four, and on average are walking more, since they can't tide the sides of freight cars. Most FRA reportable injuries stem from walking. You also have a long-term recipe for prematurely worn body parts, early retirements, and associated FELA claims. So which is safer over the long term, remote control or conventional switching? Remote control safety claims need revision because the claimed rate of injury per switch engine-hour does not demonstrate the amount of remote control switching work accomplished in relation to the injuries sustained, long-term.

If we are truly a railroad community, then we should all have a voice in helping management differentiate true economy from false economy. In the case of remote control, when all factors are taken together, why would railroads want to de-leverage the productive capacity of well-capitalized classification yards in exchange for marginal, if not negative, remote control economics? Is it because railroads are starved for high-tech identity?

Max Taliaferro, my yard job foreman, and I would welcome a derby challenge from any cherry-picked remote control crew to approach, equal, or exceed two-thirds of our productivity with a conventional switch engine.

Robert Frank, BNSF Locomotive Engineer

Cost structure of railroads

Penn State University

To the Editor:

Based on comments received, we wish to add two additional points to our Point of View column (RA, May, p. 64).

First, although it is true that railroad rates are too low on average, this does not mean that all railroad rates are too low. There may be cases where a single railroad controls enough of the origins and destinations to avoid significant price competition from other rail carriers. We can envision situations in which price and service competition should be increased by some sort of open access, but not so open as to completely sever the relationship between freight operations and infrastructure ownership as in Britain.

Second, while the column's headline ("Are shippers pressing too hard?") might appear to place blame for inadequate rail earnings on shippers, we have a broader view. The structure of the marketplace and the cost structure of railroads are the roots of the problem. They shape the behavior of shippers and carriers.

Peter F. Swan and John C. Spychalski

Intermodalism at FHWA

Alexandria, Va.

To the Editor:

I read Bob Leilich's editorial in your April issue (p. 60) with interest. I would like to add my comments, based the nearly two years I spent with the Office of Freight Management and Operations, a group within the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).

Until recently, I would have been in full agreement with Leilich about the lack of a multimodal approach with the Department of Transportation. Historically, this was not its role, with each mode being treated separately, mostly from a safety standpoint. This focus started to change under ISTEA in 1991 and became more important under TEA-21 in 1998. Changes included the appointment of an Undersecretary for Intermodalism, as well as creation of the Office of Freight Management and Operations (the Freight Office) to promote an intermodal policy approach to future freight transportation planning and operations.