Lessons from Fox River Grove

Railway Age, March, 1997 by Luther S. Miller

By raising the level of public awareness, and encouraging harsh penalties for crossing-safety violations, a tragic schoolbus accident has dramatically reduced crossing incidents in Metra territory, and possibly nationwide.

In Oct. 25, 1995, a grade crossing crash at Fox River Grove, Ill., took seven lives. It may have saved many more.

The death of seven schoolchildren and the serious injuries suffered by 24 others when a Metra commuter train tore into the end of a schoolbus dramatically heightened public awareness of the potential for tragedy at crossings. It also caused the Illinois legislature to enact stiff new penalties for grade crossing safety violations.

The results have been impressive. In 1995, there were 48 accidents, 43 injuries, and 23 fatalities at the 542 grade crossings in Metra commuter rail territory. In 1996, there were 39 accidents, 17 injuries and 12 fatalities.

An all too vivid reawakening to the dangers inherent at any rail/highway crossing, however well protected by the most technologically advanced warning systems, did its part. Strong laws strongly enforced have also helped. Motorists or pedestrians who try to drive or walk around a down crossing gate are now subject to a fine of $500 or 50 hours of community service. In 1996 Metra police issued 336 citations to violators. There was a 99% conviction rate.

The Fox River Grove tragedy was flashed on television screens across the country, and federal safety officials believe it may have been partly responsible for a strong improvement last year in the national crossing safety picture. In the first 11 months of 1996, the latest period for which the Federal Railroad Administration has compiled statistics, there were 3,795 grade crossing accidents nationwide, down from 4,192 in the same months of 1995; 1,402 injuries, down from 1,730; and 419 fatalities, down from 532.

Crossing accidents, injuries, and fatalities have been trending downward for several years for a number of reasons--the extraordinary success of Operation Lifesaver, which for 25 years has been educating the public in crossing safety and is now getting more than half a million dollars a year in federal funding; the success of railroads and railroad suppliers in developing increasingly effective warning systems; the crossing safety initiatives of the U.S. Departiment of Transportation, the Federal Railroad Administration, and the Federal Highway Administration at all levels of government and the highway and railroad industries; and, not least, the $150 million a year that Section 130 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) provides for installation of warning systems. These programs have worked well; they work better in the wake of such high-profile incidents as that at Fox River Grove.

A COMMUNICATIONS GAP

In a 74-page report on its investigation of the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board needed only half a page, in language at once dry and dramatic, to tell the story of what happened at Fox River Grove, and probably why it happened:

"On Oct. 25, 1995, at 7:10 a.m., the Northeast Illinois Commuter Railroad Corporation (d/b/a Metropolitan Rail) express commuter train 624 struck the rear left side of a stopped Transportation Joint Agreement School District 47/155 school bus at a railroad/highway grade crossing in Fox River Grove, Ill. The accident occurred after the school bus had crossed the railroad tracks and stopped for a red traffic signal, with its rear extended about three feet into the path of the train.

"Of the 35 school bus passengers, seven sustained fatal injuries, 24 sustained serious injuries, and four were not injured. The schoolbus driver received minor injuries. The three crew-members and the estimated 120 passengers on the train were uninjured.

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collision was that the bus driver had positioned the school bus so it encroached upon the railroad tracks because of the failure of: 1) the Illinois Departiment of Transportation to recognize the short queuing area on northbound Algonquin Road and to take corrective action; 2) file Illinois Departiment of Transportation to recognize the insufficient time of the green signal indication for vehicles on North Algonquin Road before the arrival of a train at the crossing; and 3) the Transportation Joint Agreement School District 47/155 to identify route hazards and to provide its drivers with alternative instructions for such situations. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Illinois Department of Transportation and its contractors, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the railroads to have a communications system that ensures understanding of the integration and working relationship of the railroad and highway signal systems."

Most simply put, there was a communications breakdown, for which IDOT seemed ultimately responsible. The road that crosses Union Pacific (ex-C&NW) tracks at Fox River Grove had been widened and reconfigured and resignaled for highway traffic by contractors who apparently did not have a precise knowledge of what was needed to interconnect safely with the grade crossing signaling. As the NTSB report noted, "The FRA requires railroads to provide a minimum of 20 seconds of warning time before train arrival at a grade crossing," tests having established that "warning times in excess of 30 to 40 seconds caused many motorists to engage in risky behavior." The C&NW had occasion in 1992 to remind IDOT of its 20-second minimum. Somehow the message didn't get across, then or later.