Blue-ribbon panel spells the blues for passenger rail

Railway Age, August, 1997 by WIlliam C. Vantuono

It's been said that a camel is a horse created by a committee. If that's true, recent recommendations made by a committee of "experts" for preserving intercity passenger rail service might best be relegated to the desert, where they will hopefully dry up and blow away.

The ideas developed by the Working Group on Intercity Rail, appointed by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee to suggest solutions to Amtrak's precarious situation, are not shared by many, including two Working Group members who wrote a dissenting minority opinion. And by some accounts, Committee Chairman Bud Shuster (R-Pa.) has distanced himself from the Working Group's recommendations.

In fairness to the Working Group, few would disagree with its basic goal: preservation and enhancement of intercity passenger rail service, particularly in corridors where highway and airport congestion is a problem. And its general assessment of Amtrak's problems is fundamentally sound: "Amtrak's mission is vaguely defined, its funding has never been adequate for a true national system, and it has been burdened with expensive legal mandates." So it's not the Working Group's intent but its proposals that have largely been discounted and criticized as suffering from flawed judgment and a lack of understanding.

The Working Group came up with two main recommendations: separating ownership of passenger rail infrastructure from operation of passenger trains, an arrangement under which other operators would be able to compete with Amtrak to provide services; and use of federal funds for capital infrastructure improvements only--not for operations, Operating support would be the responsibility of the states.

Why do so many take such strong exception to these proposals? After all, wouldn't competition be good for passenger railroads (as it is for freight railroads)? And shouldn't states be allowed to spend their transportation dollars as they see fit?

First, look at the concept of separating operations from infrastructure. Britain, the best known example, used this concept to privatize British Rail passenger services last year, and there are few Brits who will tell you that things are running smoothly. Actually, for the most part, privatization has been a real boondoggle for passengers, particularly with regard to ticketing, scheduling, and information. Says Mike Knutton, editor of International Railway Journal: "Critics can argue justifiably that one of the negative results of the introduction of competition on Britain's national railways is a failure by operators to inform passengers about each other's services. The fear of losing a customer to a potential rival seems to be a blinding instinct that eclipses the practical long-term consideration that more people will use the rail network if they know they can travel from one place to another easily and cheaply. If operators won't cooperate, passengers will be discouraged from using the services simply because they will not be aware of the possible routes or fares available."

If the British are having a hard time, is there reason to believe that Americans--most of whom are willing to sit in traffic jams or deal with the assembly-line experience of flying--will tolerate such a confusing and troublesome scenario? Not likely. They'll return to their cars and their cramped aircraft. At least they'll know what to expect. And, as for a separate infrastructure company, most of the right-of-way Amtrak uses is owned by freight railroads, who have enough problems dealing with one intercity. passenger carrier. They cannot realistically be expected to welcome additional operators with open arms.

The dissenting members of the Working Group, former New Jersey Governor Jim Florio and Prof. Carl Van Horn of Rutgers, have called its recommendations "the Amtrak derailment plan." The separation of infrastructure and operations "would create a crisis in rail transportation in the Northeast Corridor and the erosion or collapse of interstate passenger rail elsewhere in the country. Such a strategy would result in greater taxpayer costs, more bureaucracy, and fewer trains." As for using federal dollars exclusively for capital purposes, leaving operating support to the states, Florio and Van Horn say this would create "an unfunded mandate" for the states, who would provide funding "insufficient to keep most trains going."

Some of the Working Group's recommendations are based on an assumption of poor Congressional support for Amtrak. This is far from the truth, as evidenced by the efforts on the part of key Congressional leaders to provide Amtrak with labor and other business reforms as well as a dedicated capital trust fund using a half-penny of the existing federal gas tax. Even Bud Shuster, who has opposed the half-penny, has indicated he may support the half-penny provided other reforms are enacted.

Where support has been lacking is in the Administration, which thus far has opposed these efforts to provide Amtrak with a solid foundation for the future. One can only hope that President Clinton--and others who will ultimately decide Amtrak's fate--will understand that the Working Group came up with more questions than answers. The search for answers continues, and the time grows shorter, as Amtrak confronts the very real prospect of bankruptcy and break-up as a national system.