Iraq & just-war thinking: the presumption against the use of force

Commonweal, Sept 27, 2002 by George A. Lopez

The Washington view about war with Iraq has moved precipitously from "a rumor of war" to "foregone conclusion." Although prominent policy makers, including Republicans, have questioned the wisdom of the Bush administration's call for regime change, many end their remarks with, "the president has yet to make the case"--anticipating, of course, that he will.

No one can pretend that just-war principles have ever governed U.S. foreign policy. But in recent years, debates about the use of force--in the Persian Gulf, in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in response to September 11--have been informed, at least partially, by the ethical criteria of the just-war tradition. But a focus on these criteria was visibly lacking at the Senate Foreign Relations committee hearings on Iraq in July and August. And National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice observed recently that removing Saddam Hussein from power might be the moral obligation of the United States, without specifying the moral grounds. Does the just-war tradition have any relevance to the decision to go to war with Iraq?

American culture generally--and decision makers in particular--rarely accept what some just-war thinkers consider a foundation stone: there is a "presumption against the use of force," and who regard the just-war criteria as impediments to which exceptions might be made in a specific case. Yet others understand the just-war tradition as permitting the use of force once certain conditions are met. In practice then, just-war thinking becomes a pro forma checklist to be met by decision makers who want U.S. citizens to consider the use of force moral and legal. Often enough, at the top of their checklist sits the selection of a norm-laden nom de guerre, Operation Just Cause (Panama), or Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), signifying an adherence to ad bellum concerns. The preponderance of the checklist focuses on the in bello problems of proportionate response, avoidance of civilian casualties, and insuring that war is a last resort. This checklist approach was clearly manifest in the congressional debates that preceded the war against Iraq in 1990-91.

Catholic intellectuals and church leaders have contributed to the checklist mentality by failing to respond to the changing conduct of war. In contrast, "The Challenge of Peace," the Catholic bishops' 1983 pastoral letter, made a substantive and politically effective contribution to U.S. thinking about the morality of nuclear weapons and war-fighting doctrines by directly linking these security challenges to dictates about the just-war responsibility of U.S. decision makers. The two letters that followed (the bishops' 1994 anniversary reflection on "The Challenge of Peace," and "Living with Faith and Hope after September 11") had their strengths, but neither provided a compelling and comprehensive framework tied to the genuine security concerns of Americans. Now we face, according a Defense Department "Nuclear Posture Review," leaked last Feburary, the possibility of a pre-emptive strike on Iraq and the possible use of low-yield nuclear weapons to destroy hardened Iraqi bunkers. In these circumstances, we desperately need the contemporary equivalent of the bishops' 1984 letter, which noted that the moral acceptance of policies (in this case, deterrence policy) be strictly conditioned. We need a bold restatement of their central message: "peacemaking is no longer an optional commitment of faith."

In a world with only one superpower, U.S. Catholics must thoroughly debate the meaning, scope, and relevance of just-war thinking. Whatever the uncertainties and real threat of terrorism today, virtually no existing war scenario places this country at risk--militarily, politically, or socially. While there can be rightful concern about the number of American lives lost in battle, the major moral dilemmas facing the country right now lie in the damage levels that could be inflicted on Iraq and the conditions under which we proclaim victory. Such an unbalanced military situation is unprecedented. Yet it has not led to any reassessment by Catholic leaders of what might constitute a "just war" for the United States in these circumstances. Our failure to think ahead is coming back to haunt us in an atmosphere of the "foregone conclusion" of war with Iraq.

To understand the specific challenges that have gone unmet and have helped to create the untenable situation faced by just-war thinking, consider the last dozen years, and the wars in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Three unresolved dilemmas--one regarding ad bellum concerns, the other two in bello controversies--make up the legacy of the three U.S. wars. These dilemmas challenge the ability of the just-war tradition to prohibit or to limit the character of a new war against Iraq. The first area of concern lies in the ad bellum criteria of right authority. The Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan were all fought under ad bellum criteria to defend and re-establish important international norms. Yet only in the case of the Gulf War did the United States seek and receive authorization of the international community via a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force.