Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft

Commonweal, Oct 6, 1995 by James Finn

This is a book whose time has come. Although the phenomenon it examines is not new--the exclusion of religion as a factor in statecraft--recent vents have created a climate in which it may be more readily acknowledged, even, possibly, corrected. As an augury of this possibility the book carries a favorable blurb from Henry Kissinger, a high practitioner of Realpolitik, and the author of a recent, admirable 900-page book titled Diplomacy, the index of which has many references to Poland but is completely innocent of a reference to religion or John Paul II.

In his acknowledgments Douglas Johnston explains that the genesis of the book sprang from his growing awareness that various conflicts in the world were being reconciled, often by religious agents and agencies, in ways that were not being recognized. This insight led gradually to meetings, steering committees, a slew of expert consultants, grants, assignments, contributors and, consequently, this book. The process itself extended over a number of years and the book reveals a number of the tensions that inevitably arise when people with different experiences and different interests but strong views collaborate. The book also moves along two different paths. Some of the writers wish to show the positive character of religious agencies as mediators of conflict. Others stress that religion can be a force to reckon with when it is divisive as well as when it is healing, when it is the cause of conflict as well as when it mediates; good foreign policies should take account of both aspects.

The core of the book consists of a series of case histories that illustrate the way in which religious agents and agencies have acted in various kinds of conflicts. These range widely to areas that include Nicaragua, Nigeria, East Germany, the Philippines, South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. These well-researched and frequently detailed studies illustrate very well how religious actors have successfully resolved or, at least, reduced conflict and have proven to be very effective mediators. Johnston notes that although he and his colleagues made a concerted effort to find cases that would represent different problems and different religious traditions, these examples are heavily weighted in favor of Christianity. Comparable studies involving other religious traditions have yet to be made.

These case histories bear most heavily the mark of the initiating impulse, that is, they are focused on conflict resolution. But statecraft extends far beyond that. Sound statecraft depends upon proper appreciation of the major factors in play and, to speak only of U.S. policies, religion is very frequently omitted from consideration as one of those factors. The result is an inadequate understanding of the forces at work and, therefore, inadequate policies.

Two fine opening articles by Edward Luttwak and Barry Rubin--familiar names in the field of international affairs--focus exactly on this issue. Rubin opens his article with the clear assertion that "United States foreign policy in recent decades has often misread the importance of religion as a factor in the national policies and international behavior of some countries and regions. This has sometimes led to incorrect analysis and erroneous policy responses that have proven quite costly." In complete agreement with this judgment, Luttwak locates the cause for the failure in continuing Enlightenment prejudice, materialistic determinism, and a secularizing reductionism. Although recent historical events make abundantly evident that religion is not fading from the world scene and is, in a number of countries, asserting ever greater cultural and political influence, many policy makers, out of habit or inertia, cling to the expectation that it is a declining and even negligible quantity. (Paradoxically, it is often those who claim to be political realists who make this unrealistic assessment.) Luttwak shows how a misreading of religious forces led to unsound U.S. analyses in Lebanon, Vietnam, Sudan, and Iran.

In a summing up near the end of the book, Stanton Burnett offers an overview and a nuanced assessment. He is intent on making clear that "the authors in this volume are not indicting U.S. diplomacy. We write about it because it is ours, and because of the hope we invest in the demonstrated seriousness and flexibility of its officials." He adds, however, that those who make policy and engage in diplomacy have a real interest in understanding the role of the spiritual in conflict resolution, "an idea that may seem hopelessly idealistic to a practicing politician or diplomat without the historical record offered by the cases to demonstrate that such a role was actual and effective in important past instances." The benefits of such understanding "are not precisely calculable but are clearly enormous."

After the analyses that constitute most of the book it is disconcerting to read Johnston's conclusions: "The central lesson of these case studies is that religion does not always have to be a negative factor in the policymaking equation. Its potential contribution to peacemaking is substantial and worthy of further study." Modesty may be called for, but such diffidence is deflating. The central message of this book can legitimately be phrased in stronger and more compelling terms.