Shattering philsophy's mirror: a conversation with Richard Rorty - philosopher - Cover Story

Commonweal, May 6, 1994 by Gordon D. Marino

Given the role of theory or general ideas in leftist critique, it is no wonder that Rorty's apostasy of theory has irked critics on the left. Rorty, who has publicly stated, "I think our country--despite its past and present atrocities and vices ... is a good example of the best kind of society so far invented," is regarded by certain leftist thinkers as an apologist for the Haves. As they see it, Rorty would have a different opinion of the value of theory if he had his office among the Have-nots.

What got Rorty into trouble with thinkers on the left, got him in trouble with the right as well. Like the therapeutic discovered and so richly detailed by Philip Rieff, Rorty has a certain distrust of the yak yak yak of conscience. Rorty is of the deep-seated conviction that it is possible to be a self-consistent Nazi. What the Nazi lacks is not a theory of morality, but rather a heart, or the right set of feelings. In this regard, Rorty follows Hume and Schopenhauer. Again, Rorty confesses:

...there is no answer to the question "Why not be cruel?"

There is no noncircular theoretical backup for the belief

that cruelty is horrible. Nor is there any answer to the

question "How do you decide when to struggle against

injustice and when to devote yourself to private projects

of self creation?"... I do not think there are any plain moral

facts out there in the world, nor any truths independent

of language, nor any neutral grounds on which to stand

and argue that either torture or kindness are [sic] preferable

to the other (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity).

While critics on the left call Rorty "complacent," critics on the right chide him for being a relativist. Characteristically, Rorty rejects the charge of relativism by refusing to answer it. That is, he argues that "relativism" is a term in a vocabulary which he flatly rejects--a vocabulary that is intimately bound up with the fantastic project of providing rational foundations for our moral preferences. Rorty remarks, "The right's hostility is largely explained by the fact that the rightist thinkers don't think that it is enough just to prefer democratic societies. One also has to believe that they are objectively Good." Rorty doesn't.

Before taking leave, I asked Professor Rorty if I could get a glimpse of some of his most recent work. One of the walls of his quite humble office is packed with a post office of cubby holes, each of which contains a fresh manuscript. Rorty was generous enough to place a stack of his thoughts in my hand. His most recent essays bear titles such as, "Feminism and Pragmatism," "Love and Money," and "Tales of Two Disciplines." For all his rhetoric to the effect that our public or moral interests do not hold any natural rank over our private projects (e.g., reading Proust or searching for wild orchids), Rorty's private and public interests seem to be in natural sync. Rorty psychologizes that we can promote social justice only by expanding the circle of our community, by increasing the scope of our feeling of solidarity. While I would not want to offend him by describing him as a moralist, Rorty the sexagenarian is fighting what the youngstar Rorty would have taken to be the good fight, the best way he knows how--by writing gleaming essays on social issues and the curriculum of our sentimental education.