Reconnecting with Iran

USA Today (Society for the Advancement of Education), May, 2000 by Llewellyn D. Howell

THERE WAS A TIME when Iran was the best friend the U.S. had in the Middle East. Although the relationship was primarily strategic, focusing on the non-Arab state as a buttress against feared Arab military strength, there were numerous linkages between Americans and Iranians as well. Large numbers of Iranians were being educated in the U.S., and many professionals remained, often in medicine and mathematics, education and engineering. Iranians demonstrated an integrative capability in the U.S., interacting easily with Americans and blending into the culture well and quickly.

It is true that many of these same Iranians were connected with the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Nevertheless, numerous Iranian immigrants to the U.S. now return to their homeland regularly and have learned to deal with the culture that has always underlain the Iranian state, whatever its nature. It is still their culture. Even with a relatively hostile regime in power, it is necessary to recognize the common roots of culture that ancient Persia had and modern Iran has with Europe and America. From the common origins in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to linked poetic literature to common references to Persian carpets and caviar, Iranian and European cultures have a history that far transcends the two decades of recent hostility.

Iran has the potential to be the most dynamic state in the Middle East again. With huge oil reserves (94,000,000,000 barrels--nine percent of the world's total) as well as the second largest deposit of natural gas (700 trillion cubic feet), it is capable of restructuring the world's available supplies of these fuels. Access would be critical for Asia as well as Europe and North America, and Iranian oil in the market would be likely to affect price as well as supply. American oil companies are lobbying for changes in the U.S. embargo in order to be able to participate in Iran's oil economy, where companies from France, Malaysia, and Russia already are active. Why should Washington handicap American firms again as it did in Vietnam?

Given the skills exhibited by Iranians in the U.S. and Europe, Iran also has great potential in technology-related industries, service fields, and, ultimately, the availability of venture capital. Out from under the constrictive grip of its conservative clerics and with its resources available to the market, Iran would develop quickly and spur development around it. The nation's population of 63,000,000 would be an important market for American services and products such as wheat and medicines.

Its large population and Iran's position give it strategic importance, both in the military and economic sense. It borders Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan; is just across the Persian Gulf from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman; has lengthy coastlines on the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian Sea; and has some control of the Strait of Hormuz. As was discovered in recent negotiations and disputes over the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, Iran holds a critical position as a transit path between other oil-producing states and shipping lines to dependent markets. As an enemy, Iran makes both commerce and strategic access very difficult. As a friend, it could facilitate development, regional business, and cooperative alliances.

Iran's last three elections have clearly been democratic, more so than many U.S. allies in the developing world. The fact that the moderate opposition has been victorious in each, despite the resistance of the hard-line clergy, indicates several things. First, it signifies that sentiment within Iran is now in a more accommodating mode. Second, since there was no major alteration in election processes prior to the first of the three, it means that earlier elections were also democratic, albeit with outcomes the U.S. did not care for. Just as the 1979 revolution was a reflection of broad Iranian sentiment, its citizens have freely chosen to move in a different direction in 2000.

Most importantly, it is an indication of evolution within Iran that is homegrown and not a function of embargoes and economic pressures. One of the things that diplomats and scholars came to recognize in the waning days of the 20th century is that nationalist states seldom change their stripes in the face of either threats or force. The changes in Iran have been of the "pull," rather than "push," variety. It is a desire for freedom of expression, freedom to dress as they choose, and, not incidentally, freedom to have access to satellite television and information coming from outside Iran's controlled environment. As columnist Thomas Friedman noted in The New York Times, Iranians want "to be a part of the global conversation"--a conversation derived from the West and especially from the U.S.

There are good reasons for America to seek out a reestablishment of its alliance with Iran, and the opening is there. How can this be accomplished?

The U.S. must demonstrate an ability to take control of the chain of events that will lead to normalization of relations. Since its hostage humiliation in 1979, the U.S. has mostly been sulking, as it did after the Vietnam War, waiting for the winner in the conflict suddenly to transform itself. Nationalism rears its head in America just as it does in other states, but a radical transformation is no more likely to happen with Iran than it did with Vietnam. Why sit and wait?