Shoot first, talk later: how the U.S. has abandoned diplomacy

USA Today (Society for the Advancement of Education), July, 2004 by Craig R. Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman

"With the fall of the Soviet Union over a decade ago, the U.S. had a unique opportunity ... to lead the world toward a period of greater cooperation through the use of diplomacy, international organization, and international law. Instead, the world is drifting toward military anarchy while democracy at home continues to erode at a frightening pace."

"WE ALL HAVE to recognize that no matter how great our strength, we must deny ourselves the license to do as we please. No one nation ... can or should expect any special privilege which harms any other nation. Unless we are all willing to pay that price, no organization for world peace can accomplish its purpose. And what a reasonable price that is!"--Pres. Harry, S. Truman, 1945.

In the aftermath of the war against Iraq in 1991, there was widespread reaffirmation of both the role of the United Nations and the rule of law. The U.S. went into battle with a carefully crafted coalition of 34 nations that included many Islamic states, even Syria. There was an international consensus and sympathy in sup port of the conflict, known as Desert Storm, to end the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The coalition involved not only troops, but treasure. Countries such as Japan, which found it too controversial to deploy military forces to the Persian Gulf, instead sent enormous funds to the U.S. in support of the war effort. In fact, the international community absorbed the bulk of the conflict's costs.

In 2001, the U.S. went to war against Afghanistan in self-defense after the traumatic terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. Again, it received international backing and even greater international sympathy. Masses and marches all over the world expressed profound sadness for what had taken place and conveyed resolve for virtually any U.S. response. The French newspaper Le Monde demonstrated unprecedented empathy for this country's plight with the banner headline, "We are all Americans."

In 2003, the U.S. again went to war; on this occasion, however, there virtually was no international sympathy and little support for its actions. Within the United Kingdom, the only other serious proponent of the war, there were huge demonstrations against Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Prime Minister Tony Blair was reprimanded in the British parliament for his willingness to be the cat's paw of the U.S. The political positions of Blair and Pres. George W. Bush suffered when it was demonstrated that Washington and London had lied at the highest levels to gain congressional and parliamentary support for the decision to sock a military solution.

The popularity and credibility indexes of Blair and Bush continued to decline in the wake of the invasion because of their miserable handling of the post-war Iraqi situation. Whereas Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt had begun planning for a post World War II Europe and Asia three years before the end of the conflict, there was little or no such foresight in Washington and London for Iraq. The Bush Administration's disdain for multilateralism and its crude exploitation of the 9/11 attacks to justify military action pointed to a cynical, unsophisticated, and dangerous policy process.

It became apparent in the immediate postwar period that the U.S. decision to use force had been rash and senseless, ignoring the fundamental premise that military might should be the last--not the first--option. There was no near-term threat to the U.S. or its interests. Yet, the U.S. made no attempt to use diplomacy or build a coalition. Rather, it went at the problem assuming that, as the world's dominant power, it had no need to gain the cooperation of the global community that was organized to meet such international challenges. This unprecedented action reflects the approach championed by neoconservative groups for the past decade. Theirs is a doctrine of unilateral and preemptive use of force and disdain for diplomacy, collective security, and multilateral organizations.

Until the Bush Administration, diplomacy was not just another option, but the primary means by which the U.S. worked with other slates to create collective security. Until recently, military muscle was used only when diplomacy failed. An important exception was the gradual slide into the Vietnam War in the 1960s, which also was marked by the misuse of intelligence information and the failure to gain international support and create a global coalition. Although the U.S. was not involved directly, there is no better example of the futility of war than in the Middle East, where conflicts in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 demonstrated the failure of diplomacy. More aggressive international diplomacy might have prevented the Arab attacks on Israel in 1948 and 1967, the British-French-Israeli coalition warfare in 1956, and the disastrous Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

The use of diplomacy seeks to prevent bilateral and regional antagonisms from descending into violence and create the means for building mutual advantage. Diplomats are trained to deal with tense situations and create peaceful solutions. Military action, however, often sparks unintended consequences that worsen geopolitical situations and leave behind desolation and bitterness, as in Afghanistan and Iraq. From 1945 to 2000, U.S. policymakers relied primarily on diplomatic instruments and collective security and, when they did not, as in Vietnam, they created economic and social weakness at home.