Economic sanctions as weapons

USA Today (Society for the Advancement of Education), July, 1995 by Llewellyn D. Howell

SINCE PRES. CLINTON usurped the previously Republican positions of free trader (China and globally) and successful employer of military might (Iraq and Haiti), the American right has been foundering for a stance on foreign policy. It ranges from the unilateral militarism of Bob Dole ("Lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and damn the allies") to the excessive isolationism of Pat Buchanan ("White family values inside fortress America"). However, both unilateralists and isolationists have found reason to support the use of economic sanctions as weapons, and on this issue they have found an ally in Clinton. As the U.S. has become more of an economic actor in the international system, the use of sanctions has increased as a tool of foreign policy. Wielding an economic stick potentially can result in as much or more damage than the military approach.

The U.S. already has a number of embargoes in place in one form or another. The embargoed countries include Cuba, Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, and sanctions recently were increased for Iran. There was one in place for Haiti until its ineffectiveness led to viable threats of U.S. invasion. Should Washington be considering more applications of embargoes and other sanctions to bring about changes in the behavior of what it regards as rogue states? If it attempts to turn from the use of military weapons to economic ones, what are the challenges to be faced? Will sanctions ever be more effective than the 35-year-old embargo of Cuba by the U.S.? The calculus of economic sanctions is intricate. Here are a few of the problems to be faced:

* Most, if not all, of the other national actors must be convinced to participate. One government exercising sanctions is a demonstration of principle, but will bring about no change in behavior. Assuming the usual diversity of ideologies and self-interest, convincing other nations will involve some trade-offs. To get all other governments to support the sanctions, something must be given up or some price must be paid. Calculate that as a cost of the embargo for the sanctioning country.

* Economic sanctions always involve something lost for both sides. A product (oil, weapons, equipment) is to be denied to the sanctioned country, but the income from its production and sale is denied equivalently to the sanctioning government and/or its businesses. These costs must be factored in. If sanctions are imposed by one country, not only might sales on the embargoed products be lost, but the sanctioned nation might and probably will retaliate if possible. South Africa always has been the source of metals necessary in aircraft production. The U.S. never really embraced a full embargo of South Africa in apartheid days, partly because of a fear of retaliation that would have been a disaster for American industry and perhaps the military. At the time, the Soviet Union was the only other source of those same materials.

* Who is harmed by sanctions? While food and medicines usually are exempted from embargoes and other sanctions, those most shielded from the economic penalties often are those at the source of the policy that the sanctioner is trying to change, and those most harmed are the average citizenry and the poor. Even if state behavior is altered, will the cost to those not involved in the policy origination be too great? Will it even be considered and included in the sanction equation? It was argued that this was the problem with the embargo on Haiti. It didn't affect the ruling military junta, but impacted the poor to make them even poorer.

* A critical problem is enforcement. Even if governments are willing to cooperate, its citizens often are not. Take the example of the UN embargo against Serbia. Imposed to punish Serbs for ethnic cleansing" and for refusal to recognize Croatia and Bosnia, it prohibits the shipment of all goods except food and medical supplies. It especially is directed at material that might be intended for military use. Nevertheless, high-grade fuel, appropriate for fighter aircraft and tanks, makes its way into Montenegro (still linked with Serbia as the remnant of what once was Yugoslavia) at rates of up to 1,000,000 gallons per day. Stopping it would involve imposing UN troops inside Albania.

* Economic sanctions ordinarily are intended to bring about changes in political decision-making. In order for them to be effective, they must impact on the decision-makers. Many economists argue that there often is no such connection. Especially with authoritarian governments, where there is little responsiveness of the government to the citizenry, the decision-makers are shielded from much of the impact of sanctions that are directed at such items as fuel. Between stockpiling and smuggling, governments such as those of Serbia or the military regime of Haiti easily can survive most sanctions that are likely to be imposed.

Sanctions do serve some clear purposes, though. One is that they offer a negotiation period, a respite that permits thinking (or just some thinking) before possibly regrettable actions are taken. Some regard sanctions simply as a step to show the international community that alternatives have been tried before proceeding to military force.