1998 Ad

USA Today (Society for the Advancement of Education), Sept, 1998 by Robert J. Bresler

In this prosperous year, neither party has sold the American people on its reform agenda. With the Federal budget currently running a surplus, the stock market booming, inflation holding in check, and unemployment stabilizing at less than five percent, the public feels no urgency for change. Pres. Clinton introduces bills with a flourish and then stands by while the Republican Congress ignores them. Congress, on the other hand, has shelved or postponed introducing most of its own major reforms--the abolition of racial and gender preferences, a radical overhaul of the tax code, the privatization of Social Security, limits on tort liability, and the abolition of several Cabinet agencies.

In several Congressional primaries, voters in both parties seemed to favor candidates closer to the center over those of the left and fight extremes. Republican moderate conservatives defeated candidates supported by the religious fight in California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Mexico. Meanwhile, Democratic voters nominated moderate-to-conservative candidates in House districts in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and California. Early presidential polls show that Vice Pres. Al Gore and Texas Gov. George W. Bush, two relative moderates, were the leading candidates of their parties. Nevertheless, the trend in both parties is toward greater ideological purity. The old-line southern Democrats who were staunch conservatives long have passed from the scene, and the liberal Republicans, such as former Massachusetts Gov. William Weld, represent just a small fraction of their party.

The next several elections should give some indication if either party will move closer to the center. Much depends upon what strategies the party leaders construct and what constituencies they feel are essential to creating a governing coalition. Liberal Democrats, such as political pollster and consultant Stan Greenberg, want the party to pursue disaffected, so-called "downscale" voters with incomes below $50,000 and without a college degree. These voters, he argues, were the key to Clinton's presidential victories, and their loyalties that were lost in the 1980s must be regained permanently. Neoliberals, such as those in the Democratic Leadership Council, see the younger suburbanites as the key to the party's future. These upscale voters are more attracted to the politics of growth and less attached to the traditional entitlement programs, particularly Social Security. They do support initiatives with a certain middle-class bias--college loans, environmental protection, regulations on HMOs--and generally are favorable to the idea of some privatization of the Social Security program. Working-class voters, however, would find any tinkering with the Social Security program unsettling.

Similar differences arise over the issue of trade. Those who are prospering from the globalized economy will resist protectionism, whereas working-class voters are convinced that foreign competition is responsible for the slow increase in their wages. At some point, the Democrats are going to have to decide which constituency and what set of policies are key to their future.

The Republicans face a similar dilemma. They aspire to build a majority coalition that combines their traditional upper-middle-class voters who spring from corporate America with the middle- and working-class voters who make up much of the Christian Coalition. Their task is as tricky as it is for the Democrats. The Republicans must reconcile important policy differences. The suburban economic conservatives want to lower the marginal tax rates, reduce economic regulations, promote global trade, and privatize Social Security. The social conservatives want to limit or outlaw abortions, legalize school prayer, abolish racial and gender preferences, eliminate the National Endowment for the Arts, and establish educational vouchers for private and religious schools.

These agendas are not necessarily conflicting. The challenge to the Republicans is to meld these positions into a coherent program, avoid points of contention, and assure each faction that the other is not being favored. It is a question of priority and emphasis. Where the Democrats may have a problem with the issue of the privatization of Social Security, the Republicans may have difficulties with tax legislation, an issue at the heart of their agenda. For example, the Republican desire to eliminate the so-called marriage penalty tax provides little relief for the business community or the investor class, who wish to see the top marginal tax rate lowered and the capital gains tax eliminated. To them, tax reform must be designed primarily to encourage economic growth through greater savings and investment, not simply to promote family values.

The 1998 Congressional elections will be too influenced by incumbency, current public satisfaction with the status quo, and numerous local issues to provide a clear indication as to where each party is headed. Unlike 1994, when the Contract with America provided a broad theme, the Republicans have allowed each candidate to run on his or her own issues. Should the Clinton scandals become a major factor, it could allow candidates to avoid the larger economic issues. Some may welcome that diversion, since the leaders of both parties seem willing to postpone the overhaul of the tax code and the privatization of Social Security until after this coming Congressional election, and perhaps even after the next presidential election. Divided government also gives both parties an excuse not to push their agendas. The Congressional Republicans can claim that any major tax reform would face a Clinton veto, and the Clinton Administration can argue that any reform of Social Security requires Congressional support.