In victory's direction: where we're headed in Iraq, and why we must arrive

National Review, Sept 15, 2008 by Bing West

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Maliki has been steadily amassing power in the central government (meaning his immediate office). Maliki is notoriously overconfident. For two years, President Bush reassured him with video-phone calls every few weeks. This undercut the clout of Ambassador Crocker, because Maliki could claim to listen to no one except the president of the United States, who treated him as an equal. Maliki has also bumptiously discounted the American military role in staving off serious setbacks in Basra and in Sadr City, wrongly believing he can keep the security situation under control with the Iraqi army under his thumb.

Maliki is also sectarian. Deeply distrustful of the Sunnis, he has seen no reason to bring even a modest portion of the Sons of Iraq (some of whom have Qaeda involvement in their past) into the security forces. For over a year, Petraeus has been trying to persuade Maliki to accept at least 20,000 SOI members into the police and army, but Maliki refuses to consider it. Recently, to the Americans' distress, he has moved to arrested SOI and Awakening leaders.

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THE WAY AHEAD

The first major hurdle lying ahead will be negotiating a status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Iraq. This will take effect when the current U.N. charter, which authorizes the coalition's presence and use of force, expires at the end of this year. Maliki is insisting on very tough terms, including transfer of about 15,000 prisoners to Iraqi control (which could expose Sunnis to undue harm and possibly lead to Shiites being improperly released) and advance notice and coordination with Iraqi-government officials before launching operations (which will result in leaks and long delays).

The most extreme demand--that U.S. soldiers be subject to Iraqi laws and prosecution--will be rejected. But Maliki is also insisting on timelines, such as the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from urban areas by 2010. Whatever the final details, it is certain that Maliki will insist on a SOFA that reduces American leverage and hastens the exit of other members of the coalition, who will be reluctant to enter tedious discussions with Iraqi negotiators who don't care whether they stay or go.

On September 16, Petraeus moves up from his current job as commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq to take over U.S. Central Command, where he will recommend how to balance forces between Iraq and Afghanistan. Petraeus's former deputy, Gen. Raymond Odierno, is taking over in Iraq. This will be his third tour in that country. The next U.S. president will inherit a stable but fragile military situation in Iraq.

The major challenge will be political, with both provincial and national elections--including the post of prime minister--looming. The question that Stephen Hadley, President Bush's national-security adviser, raised in a memo in November 2006 still applies: "We need to determine if Prime Minister Maliki is both willing and able to rise above the sectarian agendas being promoted by others. Do we and Prime Minister Maliki share the same vision for Iraq?"