Chinese Tremors: A crackdown demonstrates the instability of the regime

National Review, Jan 25, 1999 by Arthur Waldron

Mr. Waldron is a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania and director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

Amid China's "Christmas crackdown" on dissent, two small news items may indicate just how worried about the coming year is the regime in Beijing. First, the prime minister warned workers building the immense Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze River that they must avoid "any carelessness or negligence." Second, the regime issued an edict declaring that earthquake forecasts were to be classified top secret.

Trivial as these may appear compared with the brutal sentences that sent four top democracy leaders-Xu Wenli, Qin Yongmin, Wang Youcai, and Zhang Shanguang-to the Gulag, the two developments betray the fear now infecting China's rulers. The high dam could well turn into a Chinese Chernobyl (and who familiar with quality control in Communist states doubts that it could?). It is the pet project of former prime minister Li Peng and reeks of the triumphalism characteristic of the Soviet Union (where Li was trained). Imposed by fiat over wide protest, the dam's construction is forcing millions of people to relocate. Even if all goes as planned, the waters will flood ancient sites and ravage the ecosystem. Outright failure, though, would cost millions of lives.

Disaster at Three Gorges would be especially serious in light of Chinese culture, which from the days of the legendary emperor Yu has reckoned the ability to "control the waters"-zhishui-to be the touchstone of sound rule. A sensitivity about earthquakes shares this association, too: Since ancient times, a character denoting them-beng-has also referred to the collapse of dynasties. And that possibility-the end of 50 years of the Communist hold-is what frightens Beijing.

That said, China's economy has performed reasonably well. President Jiang Zemin has been a conspicuous presence on the world stage. Foreign leaders have tied themselves in knots to avoid criticizing him or his government. The number of his well-equipped intern- al-security forces is approaching 4 million, and that does not include the People's Liberation Army.

Yet Jiang and his comrades have ample reason to fear a tumble. Recall how they came to power: Ten years ago, as the blood was still being mopped up in central Beijing, the (relatively) liberal prime minister, Zhao Ziyang, who had opposed the use of force, was packed off to house arrest by Deng Xiaoping-and Jiang and his men were installed. The new leadership then used three tools to stabilize China and restore its international image, all while avoiding meaningful political change. Skilled diplo- macy brought in foreign money to fuel economic growth; foreign political support was brilliantly courted and secured, to compensate for lack of legitimacy at home; and limited repression was applied to those dissidents uncowed by the Tiananmen massacre.

For almost a decade, these tools were effective; but no longer. The once- booming coastal economy is slowing, even as the government spends massively. Foreign markets are saturated with Chinese goods, and foreign investment is on the decline. Selective repression has failed to do the job, too-which is why the leadership is carrying out the current, particularly crude crackdown. But full-blooded totalitarian repression was standard in China for 30 years under Mao, who was widely revered. That did not "work." Can anyone believe that comparatively halfhearted repression imposed by current leaders (who are not revered) will "work" now? Certainly they do not, which is why they are running scared.

For all their hard-line talk, the leaders are the weakest since 1949 and are accepted by the party only so long as they do not interfere too much with other party officials-as they are now starting to do with their crackdown. Jiang is attempting to tighten central control on cities and provinces, limiting information flow, and attacking party and military self-enrichment through arrests and executions of "corrupt" cadres.

Perhaps, like Gorbachev, Jiang imagines that corruption can somehow be stripped away to reveal the noble party beneath; both men, after all, were formed in the Fifties, when Communism could still be thought to stand for something and to work. But, as Gorbachev discovered, corruption was all that held the party together, and to attack it was to unleash a host of uncontrollable competing interests. Much the same thing is poised to happen in China.

So, far from stabilizing China, the 1998 crackdown may signal still more trouble. Other party leaders will try to keep Jiang from growing too strong, and he does not have to look far for rivals. To his left are Li Peng and others who favor a more orthodox Communist line-with themselves in command. On the more liberal side, the unrepentant Zhao Ziyang has not disappeared, and neither have his followers. (Zhao's blurred photograph was featured in a recent exhibition.) They provide a ready-made democratizing alternative within the party and have a strong following among younger and better-educated party members, as well as in society at large.